Vokabeltexte Chinesisch/ Vokabellektionen/ Lektion 859


Zeichen Pinyin Übersetzung Lernhilfen
zhi4 Fesseln, Fußfessel wiktionary Etymologie:
gu4 fesselt, legt Handfesseln an, Kragenfessel (Holz), Hosenträger, Klammern wiktionary Etymologie:
chang3 geräumig, offen, weit wiktionary Etymologie:   
cao2 Abflussrinne, Trog, Krippe, Tank, Nut, Kerbe wiktionary Etymologie:  
shen4 (durch)sickern, versickern, eindringen, erschrecken wiktionary Etymologie:

Zusammengesetzte Wörter

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Zeichen Pinyin Übersetzung
桎梏
zhi4 gu4 shackles, to shackle, restraint, yoke
加桎梏
jia1 zhi4 gu4 Schäkel
Zeichen Pinyin Übersetzung
宽敞
kuan1 chang5 geräumig
敞车
chang3 che1 offener Güterwagen
敞車
chang3 che1 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 敞车), offener Güterwagen
敞开
chang3 kai1 weit offen (stehen, sein)
敞開
chang3 kai1 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 敞开), weit offen (stehen, sein)
敞蓬车
chang3 peng2 che1 Kabriolett, Cabrio
敞蓬車
chang3 peng2 che1 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 敞蓬车), Kabriolett, Cabrio
Zeichen Pinyin Übersetzung
狭槽
xia2 cao2 Schlitz
环槽
huan2 cao2 Ringnut
環槽
huan2 cao2 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 环槽), Ringnut
饲槽
si4 cao2 Futtertrog
飼槽
si4 cao2 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 饲槽), Futtertrog
食槽
shi2 cao2 Krippe
海槽
hai3 cao2 Mulde
槽箱
cao2 xiang1 Behälter
地槽
de5 cao2 Geosynklinale
线槽
xian4 cao2 Kabelkanal
料槽
liao4 cao2 Bodenwanne
液槽
ye4 cao2 Kuvette
染槽
ran3 cao2 Farbtrog
酸槽
suan1 cao2 Säurebad
键槽
jian4 cao2 Keilnut
槽车
cao2 che1 Kesselwagen
槽車
cao2 che1 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 槽车), Kesselwagen
卡槽
ka3 cao2 Steckplatz, Einschubschlitz
油槽
you2 cao2 Ölbad
牙槽
ya2 cao2 Alveole
滑槽
hua2 cao2 Rutsche
跳槽
tiao4 cao2 die Arbeit, den Job wechseln, umsatteln <umg>
雪槽
xue3 cao2 Schneekühle
书槽
shu1 cao2 Hohlkehle
書槽
shu1 cao2 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 书槽), Hohlkehle
沟槽
gou1 cao2 Nut, geriffelt
处理槽
chu3 li3 cao2 Absetztank
處理槽
chu3 li3 cao2 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 处理槽), Absetztank
开槽的
kai1 cao2 de5 geschlitzt
開槽的
kai1 cao2 de5 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 开槽的), geschlitzt
贮油槽
zhu3 you2 cao2 Tank
显影槽
xian3 ying3 cao2 Entwicklungstrog, Entwicklungstank
顯影槽
xian3 ying3 cao2 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 显影槽), Entwicklungstrog, Entwicklungstank
污水槽
wu1 shui3 cao2 Schmutzwasserbehälter, Sinkkasten
上光槽
shang4 guang1 cao2 Lackkasten
碗状槽
wan3 zhuang4 cao2 Parabolrinne
导入槽
dao3 ru4 cao2 Einführschlitz (Fotoentwicklungsgerät)
平洗槽
ping2 xi3 cao2 Waschtrog ; Netzkasten
通风槽
tong1 feng1 cao2 Kühlkanal
通風槽
tong1 feng1 cao2 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 通风槽), Kühlkanal
碟状槽
die2 zhuang4 cao2 Parabolrinne
洗涤槽
xi3 di2 cao2 Spülbecken
油墨槽
you2 mo4 cao2 Farbwanne (Tiefdruck)
贮水槽
zhu3 shui3 cao2 Wassertank
槽电压
cao2 dian4 ya1 Badspannung
槽形针
cao2 xing2 zhen1 Rinnennadel
使起槽
shi3 qi3 cao2 wellen
书脊槽
shu1 ji3 cao2 Abpressfalz
書脊槽
shu1 ji3 cao2 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 书脊槽), Abpressfalz
油槽车
you2 cao2 che1 Kesselwagen
油槽車
you2 cao2 che1 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 油槽车), Kesselwagen
槽循环
cao2 xun2 huan2 Badumwälzung
槽循環
cao2 xun2 huan2 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 槽循环), Badumwälzung
退刀槽
tui4 dao1 cao2 Auslauf
环形槽
huan2 xing2 cao2 Eindrehung
環形槽
huan2 xing2 cao2 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 环形槽), Eindrehung
槽电流
cao2 dian4 liu2 Badstrom
槽電流
cao2 dian4 liu2 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 槽电流), Badstrom
开槽机
kai1 cao2 ji1 Schlitzmaschine
開槽機
kai1 cao2 ji1 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 开槽机), Schlitzmaschine
光油槽
guang1 you2 cao2 Lackbehälter, Lackwanne
废料槽
fei4 liao4 cao2 Abfallbehälter
廢料槽
fei4 liao4 cao2 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 废料槽), Abfallbehälter
油槽船
you2 cao2 chuan2 Tankschiff
清洗槽
qing1 xi3 cao2 Waschtrog
电解槽
dian4 jie3 cao2 elektrolytisches Bad, Elektrolysezelle
電解槽
dian4 jie3 cao2 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 电解槽), elektrolytisches Bad, Elektrolysezelle
水族槽
shui3 zu2 cao2 Aquarium
机器槽
ji1 qi4 cao2 Maschinenbütte
機器槽
ji1 qi4 cao2 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 机器槽), Maschinenbütte
酸浴槽
suan1 yu4 cao2 Säurebad
显影液槽
xian3 ying3 ye4 cao2 Entwicklerbad
顯影液槽
xian3 ying3 ye4 cao2 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 显影液槽), Entwicklerbad
抛光浴槽
pao1 guang1 yu4 cao2 Dekapierbad (Tiefdruckzylinder)
纸边滑槽
zhi3 bian1 hua2 cao2 Abfallrutsche
紙邊滑槽
zhi3 bian1 hua2 cao2 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 纸边滑槽), Abfallrutsche
槽稳定性
cao2 wen3 ding4 xing4 Badstabilität
槽口接合
cao2 kou3 jie1 he2 falzen
废料滑槽
fei4 liao4 hua2 cao2 Abfallrutsche
廢料滑槽
fei4 liao4 hua2 cao2 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 废料滑槽), Abfallrutsche
开槽滚筒
kai1 cao2 gun3 tong3 Nutzzylinder
浴槽显影
yu4 cao2 xian3 ying3 Standentwicklung
浴槽顯影
yu4 cao2 xian3 ying3 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 浴槽显影), Standentwicklung
深槽显影机
shen1 cao2 xian3 ying3 ji1 Tieftankentwicklungsmaschine
深槽顯影機
shen1 cao2 xian3 ying3 ji1 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 深槽显影机), Tieftankentwicklungsmaschine
再输入槽口
zai4 shu1 ru4 cao2 kou3 Wiedereingabeschlitz (Fotoentwicklungsapparat)
再輸入槽口
zai4 shu1 ru4 cao2 kou3 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 再输入槽口), Wiedereingabeschlitz (Fotoentwicklungsapparat)
印刷开槽机
yin4 shua4 kai1 cao2 ji1 Druckschlitzmaschine, Druckslotter
印刷開槽機
yin4 shua4 kai1 cao2 ji1 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 印刷开槽机), Druckschlitzmaschine, Druckslotter
单槽显影机
dan1 cao2 xian3 ying3 ji1 Einbadentwicklungsgerät
單槽顯影機
dan1 cao2 xian3 ying3 ji1 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 单槽显影机), Einbadentwicklungsgerät
开了槽的槽
kai1 liao3 cao2 de5 cao2 schlitzen
開了槽的槽
kai1 liao3 cao2 de5 cao2 (traditionelle Schreibweise von 开了槽的槽), schlitzen
书籍压槽成形机
shu1 ji2 ya1 cao2 cheng2 xing2 ji1 Buchformpresse
压书槽和压折痕机
ya1 shu1 cao2 he2 ya1 zhe2 hen2 ji1 Rill- und Ritzmaschine
Zeichen Pinyin Übersetzung
渗过
shen4 guo4 durchsickern, versickern
渗碳
shen4 tan4 Einsatzhärten
渗漏
shen4 lou4 Ableitung, Leck
防渗
fang2 shen4 wasserdicht
渗流
shen4 liu2 versickern
渗色
shen4 se4 blutig, blutend
渗透
shen4 tou4 durchdringen, Osmose, durchsickern, undicht sein; leck werden
渗沟
shen4 gou1 Kanalisationsrohr
渗出
shen4 chu1 durchsickern, versickern
低渗
di1 shen4 Hypoton
渗量
shen4 liang4 Osmolarität
渗入
shen4 ru4 eindringen, einsickern
入渗
ru4 shen4 Versickerung
隔渗
ge2 shen4 Versickerungsschutz
渗碳钢
shen4 tan4 gang1 Einsatzstahl
逆渗透
ni4 shen4 tou4 Umkehrosmose
半渗透
ban4 shen4 tou4 halbdurchlässig, semipermeabel
使渗透
shi3 shen4 tou4 unterwandern
能渗透
neng2 shen4 tou4 porös
渗入性
shen4 ru4 xing4 Permeabilität
反渗透
fan3 shen4 tou4 Umkehrosmose
可渗入
ke3 shen4 ru4 durchdringbar
被渗透
bei4 shen4 tou4 eindringen
抗渗性
kang4 shen4 xing4 Impermeabiltät, Undurchlässigkeit, Dichtigkeit
渗透物
shen4 tou4 wu4 Infiltrierung
渗透率
shen4 tou4 shuai4 Durchlässigkeit
可渗透
ke3 shen4 tou4 durchlässig
渗流物
shen4 liu2 wu4 ausfließendes Medium
渗透压
shen4 tou4 ya1 Turgor, osmotischer Druck
渗透性
shen4 tou4 xing4 Durchlässigkeit, Permeabilität, osmotisch
相互渗透
xiang1 hu4 shen4 tou4 gegenseitige Durchdringung
有渗透性
you3 shen4 tou4 xing4 durchlässig
不渗透的
bu4 shen4 tou4 de5 undurchlässig
渗透压力
shen4 tou4 ya1 li4 osmotischer Druck
非渗透性
fei1 shen4 tou4 xing4 Undurchdringlichkeit
不渗透性
bu4 shen4 tou4 xing4 Undurchlässigkeit
渗透活动
shen4 tou4 huo2 dong4 Infiltrierung
渗透作用
shen4 tou4 zuo4 yong4 Osmose
不可渗透
bu4 ke3 shen4 tou4 undurchlässig
Zeichen Pinyin Übersetzung
Zeichen Pinyin Übersetzung
Zeichen Pinyin Übersetzung
她很容易就向别人敞开她的大腿。
Sie macht die Beine für jeden breit. (Mandarin, Tatoeba fucongcong sacredceltic )
我新家的客厅很宽敞。
Das Wohnzimmer in meinem neuen Haus ist sehr geräumig. (Mandarin, Tatoeba fucongcong Yorwba )
我爸爸的房间很宽敞。
Das Zimmer meines Vaters ist sehr geräumig. (Mandarin, Tatoeba fucongcong MUIRIEL )
这个客厅很宽敞。
Dieses Wohnzimmer ist geräumig. (Mandarin, Tatoeba xjjAstrus Yorwba )
Zeichen Pinyin Übersetzung
家里的洗碗机算是厨房水槽旁洗碗工的对手。
The washing-up machine at home was regarded as a rival to the worker at the kitchen sink. (Mandarin, Tatoeba eastasiastudent )
Tom把除了厨房水槽之外的所有东西都打包了。
Tom seems to have packed everything but the kitchen sink. (Mandarin, Tatoeba wangzi0921 CK )
到洗涤槽去帮忙洗碗盘吧!
Go and help wash up at the sink! (Mandarin, Tatoeba trieuho )
惠子巧妙地把碗碟迭起再拿到水槽。
Keiko stapelt geschickt das Geschirr und trägt es zum Spülbecken. (Mandarin, Tatoeba basilhan xtofu80 )
Zeichen Pinyin Übersetzung

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最近美国国会众议院全票通过了一项为一百三十年前的《排华法案》道歉的议案,而在此之前,参议院已经于去年通过了同样的议案。对这一议案的通过,中 美两国的主要 Medien 都予以了显著位置的报道。国内的社会舆论如何,可想而知,自然不在话下。在美国这边,如果对于美国的社会民情稍有了解,也会明白,这种议 案的通过只是时间的问题,nach allem 美国社会在经历了六十年代的民权运动之后,在这种人权、种族问题上,已经发生了巨大的改变。不同种族、文化之间的平等,早已 成为社会意识的主流。这一道歉议案的主要发起人之一加州众议员赵美心在议案通过后表示,“我们必须要明白,这些丑陋的法律与美国的建国原则不相容。…我们 的社会不能容忍歧视”。


简单而言,美国国会于1882年5月6日通过了美国历史上第一部,也是唯一的一部, 针对特定种族的议案,即《排华法案》,基本上禁止了中国人移民美国,同时也严重限制了已经进入美国的中国人的政治经济权利。当时的总统亚瑟签署了这个议 案,使之成为法律。在十年届满之后,又被延长了十年,并在1902年被确定为永久性法律。在第二次世界大战中,在美国卷入战争之后,由于中美成为战时同盟 国,到1943年这部法律才被做了一些修改。最后一直到1965年,美国出台了新的《移民法》,才彻底取消了以原始国籍划分移民配额的原则,从而为包括中 国人在内的亚洲移民打开了门户。


关于这些上面事情的详情,任何有兴趣的人大可上网搜索资料,并非本文的重 点。这几天真正引起了我的兴趣的,是美国《时代》杂志的一篇文章。在这篇题为“一个尼日利亚人死于中国:种族关系开始紧张”的文章中,作者首先提到了中国 Medien 对于西方世界民主制度的一贯批判手法:即种族关系问题。同时作者也顺理成章地注意到,自然而然的,在这一大背景之下,在美国国会就历史上“令人感到羞 耻”的《排华法案》一事道歉之后,中国国内的 Medien 都在首要版面予以了报道。然后该文作者笔锋一转,接着就指出了中国这种民族主义自豪情节的另一个方面,即 Medien 往往回避国内自身的种族关系问题。“就在众议院致歉的同一天,在广州,一名尼日利亚人在被警察拘留后死亡。但是新闻报道对于非洲人的抗议行为,只提供 了有限的描述。…警方更是仅仅说明‘有人造成了严重的交通堵塞’”。


对于这件事我并没有刻意去观察网路上的 反应,但根据从一些朋友那里得到的信息,正如上面这篇《时代》杂志文章所描述的,“虽然中国一直自 dargestellt 是一个没有种族歧视的国家,而且常常念念不忘以往亚非 拉第三世界国家民族大团结的时代”,但在这一事件中,社交 Medien 上表现出了“令人震惊的排外情绪”。进一步而言,据我后来所知,从一些网路上具体的言论看 来,这一事件所激发的,绝不仅仅类同于前不久针对某些西方人劣行的“仇外、排外”的心态,而是更有一种针对特定人群的强烈种族自我优越感渗透在其中。事情 到了这一步的时候,就已经耐人寻味,并具有了高度的讽刺意味:就在同一时间里,当很多中国人为了美国为历史上排华道歉而倍感 dankbar 的时候,一些中国人已经开始 aufzuschreien, 要把“非洲黑鬼”统统赶出中国去了。


我看过一些西方左派后殖民主义学者的著作,其基本的论点,就是对 于殖民地历史予以全面的否定,支持少数民族、被压迫民族的解放运动,批判西方帝国主义的统治与压迫,重新解读南北半球、东西方的关系。仅从个人感觉而言, 谁也无法否认,西方几百年的殖民历史是罪恶累累,对于今天第三世界的贫困与动乱,要负很大的责任。但是我认为西方左派学术与实践中最大的问题,在于没有找 到合适的理论出路。也就是说,在一方面,他们推崇落后国家民族的自我觉醒和对西方的反抗,但是在另一方面,他们又无力解释一些独立后民族国家政权的倒行逆 施,只能采取回避的态度,从而使得其理论 kaum 说服力,自身的影响力也日渐衰微。今天中国的一些左派人士其实也面临着同样的理论困境。在一些左派的宣传中, 都喜欢提及毛时代的一句口号,“哪里有压迫,哪里就有反抗”。听起来似乎很有道理,但我的疑问是,没有经过思想意识的革命,就不会有所谓的解放,反抗之后 建立起来的,人民大众面对的,很可能是更深重的压迫和新一轮的暴政。


顺着这个思路,回到美国道歉和有人要把 “非洲黑鬼”赶出中国这件事情上来,如果把二者放在一起,我们可以很清楚地看到,这里面折射出的含义是很清楚的:中国历史上百多年的被压迫被侵略历史,塑 造了反抗的正义感与合法性,但并没有在人文意识的进步上产生多少推动作用,从而使得无论1949年国家政权的更迭,还是1978年的经济改革,都只具有物 质层面上的相对积极意义。在国内,六十年来户籍制度的存在,就是这一论断最大的证据。一个国家的大多数人口,在为经济起飞做出了巨大贡献的情况下,至今仍 然被合理合法地排斥在经济繁荣之外,而城市社会大众也对此保持了沉默。进一步看来,这个社会不但漠视、容忍了世界上最大的身份歧视制度,今天还有人要开始 走西方种族主义的老路,要把某个外来种族赶出去。


在这个时候,无需多言,我相信很多人都会明白,除了经济繁 荣,中国社会更需要的会是什么。前面提到的那篇《时代》杂志文章作者在最后说,“为了那个死去的尼日利亚人,一个来自中国官方的道歉或者一个完整的解释, 可能会是一段漫长的等待”。如果将来结果真的是这样,那么那个来自美国的道歉,大概在若干年后,只能使我们的后人为今天感到羞愧,而不是民族崛起的骄傲。

Bai Weilin

Übersetzung

American apologies for the “Chinese Exclusion Act” and the black protests in Guangzhou

Recently, the US House of Representatives voted unanimously for a motion to issue an apology for the “Chinese Exclusion Act” passed 130 years ago. Prior to this, one year ago the Senate voted a similar motion. Chinese and American media both gave reports on the vote of this motion a prominent position. For Chinese public opinion, as one can imagine, it is natural to emphasize it. On the American side, if you have some understanding of US society, you can understand that the adoption of this motion was just a question of time. After all, since the Human Rights movements of the sixties, American society has gone through great changes in the area of Human Rights and racial issues. Equality between different ethnicities and cultures has become a mainstream social conviction. After the motion was passed, one of the main supporters of this apology, Maxim Zhao, Congressman for California, said: “We have to understand that these ugly laws are incompatible with the founding principles of the United States…. Our society cannot tolerate discrimination.”

In simple terms, on the 6th of May 1882, the American Congress adopted the first and only motion in the history of the United States directed against a specific ethnicity; that is, the “Chinese Exclusion Act” basically forbid Chinese immigrants from entering the United States, and also severely limited the economic and political rights of Chinese people already residing in the United States. The then president McArthur signed this motion, making it into law. When it expired after ten years, it was extended for another ten years, and in 1902, it became a permanent law. In 1943, in the middle of World War II, after the US entered the war, because the US and China were allies, some changes were made to the law. Finally in 1965, the US introduced a new “Migration Act”, where the principle of immigration quotas based on nationality was abolished, opening the door for Asian migrants, including migrants from China.

For further details on the aforementioned, those interested can look for information on the NPC’s website; however that is not the focus of this article. What has really caught my interest lately is an article in the American “Time” magazine. In this article entitled, “A Nigerian dies in China: tension in ethnic relations”, the writer first mentions that the Chinese media have always been critical of one thing in the Western World’s democracies: the issue of ethnic relations. At the same time, the author also notes that, naturally, in this context, the Chinese domestic media were the primary forum for reporting on the apology from the US Congress for the “Chinese Exclusion Act” which “made people ashamed” of history. But then, the author of this article accurately points out another aspect of this Chinese nationalistic pride, namely that the media tends to avoid the issues concerning ethnic relations in China. “On the same day that Congress voted in favour of issuing an apology, in Guangzhou, a Nigerian man died whilst in police custody. But the news reports on the African demonstrations were limited in their descriptions… the police explanation was that ‘some people were causing serious traffic jams'”.

On this matter, I did not bother looking at reactions on the internet, but according to some information I received from friends, as described in the aforementioned ‘Time’ magazine article, “Although China has always prided itself on being a country free of ethnic discrimination, and is often fixated on a period in the past when there was great unity between the Third World countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.” However, in this case, social media showed “shocking levels of xenophobia”. Furthermore, as I later learnt, judging from a few comments on the web, this incident incited not only “xenophobic and racist” attitudes towards some Westerners, but even more than that, strong feelings of racial superiority towards specific peoples. As things took this turn, one thing is particularly worth noting, as well as highly ironic: at the same time that many Chinese people were very grateful to have received an apology from America for their historical exclusion, some Chinese people had already started declaring that they wanted ‘African niggers’ to get out of China.

I have read the works of a few left-wing post-colonial Western scholars. Their basic argument is a largely negative view of colonial history, support for ethnic minorities and the liberation movements of the oppressed, criticism of the rule and oppression of Western imperialism, and a reinterpretation of the relationship between North and South, East and West. From a personal perspective, no-one can deny that the centuries of Western imperialism were evil, and are largely responsible for poverty and unrest in the Third World today. But I think the biggest problem with the practices of Western left-wing scholars is that they haven’t found an appropriate theoretical solution. In other words, on the one hand, they respect the self-assurance and resistance to the West of backwards nations; but on the other hand, they are unable to explain the depravity of a number of post-independence regimes, they can only adopt an evasive attitude, which makes their theories weak and unconvincing. Some leftists in today’s China are facing the same theoretical dilemma. Some left-wing propaganda quotes slogans from the Mao era such as: “where there is oppression, there will be resistance”. It sounds very reasonable, but my question is, without an ideological revolution, there can be no so-called liberation, and after the revolt is over, what the masses are facing may well be further oppression and a new generation of tyrants.

Following on from this idea, and returning to the matter of the US apology and people shouting “niggers out” in China, if we put the two together, we can see very clearly the meaning of this: the Chinese have experienced a hundred years of oppression and aggression, shaping their sense of justice and the legitimacy of resistance; however, this experience has had no role in promoting the progress of human consciousness. The change of regime in 1949 and the economic reforms of 1978 had a relatively positive influence only on a materialistic level. The persistence of the household registration system for over sixty years is the greatest evidence of this. A majority of the population who made a significant contribution to China’s economic take-off is still legitimately excluded from economic prosperity, but most of urban society remains silent about this point. To take this assertion one step further, Chinese society not only ignores and tolerates the largest scale discrimination in the world, but people today also seem to be taking the road of Western racism, and casting out certain foreigners.

At this time, needless to say, I believe many people understand what Chinese society needs apart from economic prosperity. The author of the “Time” magazine article mentions at the end of his piece: “We may have to wait a long time for either an official Chinese apology, or an explanation, for the death of that Nigerian man.” If that is really how things are, then this apology from the US, after many years, will probably bring our descendants only shame for today’s China, rather than national pride.

Source: 1510, June 24 2012 – http://www.my1510.cn/article.php?id=79545

Julien Leyre website


国家副主席习近平对美国进行的正式访问,正值中国、美国都面临领导人换届之际,此行在国内外引起广泛关注。作为国家副主席的习近平,在与美国各界交往中表现出了官员中难得一见的平易、亲和,最为罕见、可贵的则是他的幽默感。如此轻松的神态、心态,或可在很大程度上预示未来中国对美国、对于既有国际秩序的态度。

现代国际秩序的基础性规则是在中国缺席的情况形成的。从19世纪中期开始,中国人被迫面对这个秩序,随后开始了漫长的调适过程。20世纪以来,因为中国内部政局的剧烈变化,这一调适过程经历了多次剧烈反复。在过去半个多世纪,先是40年代末一边倒向苏联,60年代则与苏联分裂,70年代初与美国建交,80年代中美关系升温,但到了80年代末,两国关系急剧降温,随后缓慢恢复。

中国国际大战略如此剧烈波动导致了严重的后果:20世纪中期以来的中国虽然是大国,却始终没有参与到可持续的战后国际秩序的塑造过程中。对这个秩序而言,中国始终是局外人,且中国始终具有局外人的心态。另一方面,在频繁的大波动中,从政治家到外交界,从学界到民众,人们经常被经济变换以及政治冲突所导致的激烈情绪左右。

中国正是在这种背景下开始在经济、乃至综合国力上崛起的。按照某些计算方法,中国的经济总量已超过美国。中国越来越深入地渗入其他国家:中国诸多产品占领了全球市场,中国企业家在世界各地购买资源、资产,刚刚富裕起来的中国富人甚至中产群体,在巴黎、纽约疯狂抢购奢侈品。

总之,国际秩序的均衡点开始大幅度地偏转。对于中国,对于中国之外的世界,这都是一次巨大的挑战。可以说,国际秩序正在经历苏联崩溃之后的一次大调整。而从长远来说,这次调整乃是国际秩序形成大约三百年来最为重大的。因为,此前,还没有一个国家有中国如此巨大的规模。完全可以确信,

未来一段时间内,全球最为重大的国际事务就是中国与国际秩序之调适,直到中国扮演起与其规模相当的、恰当的国际角色。核心问题是,中国的恰当角色究竟是什么,中国是否以及能否承担这个角色。过去的十年还只是这个相当漫长的调适过程的一个开端。

由此也就可以理解各方心态、策略、战略的犹豫不定。面对中国的崛起,国际社会、主要是欧美的第一反应似乎是中国威胁论。稍微平静下来之后则出现了中国责任论。“中美共治”是中国责任论之美国版本。显然,美国、欧洲正在适应一个日益强大的中国,并且准备在国际体系中接受中国处于重要位置。当然,这未必是中国最终的恰当位置。

中国的态度同样经历了较大变化。从最早的韬光养晦,到中间的和平崛起,再到和谐世界。由此可以看出,中国逐渐具有了主动参与国际体系之意识。与中国责任论相呼应,过去十年来,中国在很多方面也确实承担起了责任。

但从根本上说,中国目前仍然没有形成一套获得上下普遍认可的稳定的国际秩序观。举其大者,如何对待美国就是一个总能引起广泛争议的话题。有不少人把美国视为竞争对手甚至是敌人,认为美国必定遏制中国。根据这一判断,有人提出中俄应当结盟,以抗衡美国。另有人认为,欧美要求中国承担责任,乃是给中国设下的一个圈套,中国不应当承担。这种分歧有些时候会反映到短期外交政策中。

出现这种分歧的根本原因在于中国内部。具体而言,中国尚处于改革过程中,因此,不同群体间的观念可能存在较大分歧,并且由于制度约束,难以达成共识。比如,对于中国的国力究竟处于何种状态,中国应当在国际秩序中追求何种位置,不同群体间的看法差距极大。哪怕在政、学界精英群体内部,对上述问题似乎也难以达成共识,难以形成长期稳定的战略。这样,中国在国际舞台上,大体只能以短期的策略被动地应对,而无法主动追求自己的明晰目标。中国的这种状态反过来又引起外部世界的迷惑与狐疑。

也正是在这个意义上,习近平访美所展现的从容与信心,让人对于未来中国与国际秩序的关系,或可保持某种乐观。未来的国际秩序是否还能保持稳定,取决于中国与之调适的战略是否明智,而这又取决于中国的领导者是否具有长远眼光,取决于精英群体是否能够凝聚共识,从而在二三十年内始终追求一个目标。换言之,国际秩序之维护与优化取决于中国人的心态,从容和信心是一个良性的开端。

China Newsweek Artikel

Make the best of the new world order

Vice-President Xi Jinping´s state visit to the USA was undertaken as both countries approach leadership changes, and the trip attracted widespread attention at home and abroad. As Vice-President, in his contacts with the various sectors of American society, Xi Jinping revealed a humility and affinity seldom found in government officials. Most rare and valuable of all, however, was his sense of humour. Such lightness of manner and mentality may presage in large measure China´s future stance towards the United States and towards the current international order.


The fundamental rules of the contemporary international order were developed in circumstances where China was not present. Starting in the mid 19th Century, the Chinese were forced to confront this international order, and then the long readjustment process began. In the 20th Century, because of radical changes in China’s domestic political situation, this readjustment process has seen many drastic reversals. Over the past fifty-plus years, firstly, at the end of the 1940s we sided with the Soviet Union. In the 1960’s, however, we broke with them. At the beginning of the 1970s we established diplomatic relations with the United States. In the mid-1980s the relationship warmed, at the end of the 80s it cooled abruptly, and then it slowly recovered.


Such drastic fluctuations in China’s strategic relations have had serious consequences: from the mid-twentieth century, although China has been a great power, it has never taken part in the process of the shaping of the post-War international order. As far as this international order is concerned, China has always been an outsider, and furthermore, China has always had an outsider’s mentality. Taken from another angle, in the midst of frequent great instability, people, from politicians to diplomats, from academics to the general public, have often been affected by the intense emotions that economic change and political conflict give rise to.


It is from just this type of context that China is rising, economically and also in total national strength. By certain methods of calculation, China’s total economy has already overtaken that of the United States. China is entering ever more deeply into other countries: many Chinese products have captured global markets, Chinese entrepreneurs are buying resources and capital all over the world, and China´s newly-rich and even the middle-class are in a mad rush to buy luxury goods in Paris and New York.


In other words, the equilibrium point of the international order has started to shift substantially. For China, and for the world outside China, this is a huge challenge. It could be said that the international order is experiencing a major readjustment following the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, from a long-term perspective, this readjustment is the most significant since the formation of the international order around three hundred years ago. This is because, up until now, there has been no country on the scale of China. We can rest assured that, at some time in the not-too-distant future, the most important thing in international affairs globally will be the readjustment between China and the international order to the point where China plays an international role commensurate with and appropriate to its size. The key questions are what exactly China´s appropriate role is, and whether China is taking on, or can take on, this role. The past ten years has been no more than a start to this rather long readjustment process.


It is from here that the mental, tactical and strategic indecision from various parties can be understood. Faced with China´s rise, the first response of the international community, primarily Europe and the United States, was talk of the China threat. After calming down somewhat talk of China´s responsibility appeared. The United States´ version of China´s responsibility is “Sino-American co-governance”. Clearly the United States and Europe are adapting to an increasingly powerful China, and preparing to accept China in an important position in the international system. It goes without saying that this is not necessarily China´s final appropriate position.


China´s approach has similarly undergone relatively large changes; from keeping its cards close to its chest and biding time early on, to mid-period peaceful rise, and then to a harmonious well-ordered world. It is here that China´s gradual coming to consciousness of its active part in the international system can be discerned. In concert with the talk of China responsibility, over the past ten years China has indeed taken on responsibility in many areas.


However, at bottom, China today has not yet developed a stable way of viewing the international order which is broadly accepted at all levels. To cite a major issue, how to approach the United States is a topic which always arouses controversy. There are a lot of people who see the United States as a competitive rival or even an enemy, believing that the United States must contain China. Based on this assessment, some suggest that China and Russia should form an alliance, to match the United States. Others believe that Europe and the USA´s asking China to assume responsibility is a trap, and that China should not take it on. These sorts of divisions at times find themselves reflected in short-term foreign affairs policies.


The root cause of the appearance of these sorts of differences is domestic. To be specific, China is still in the process of reform. Therefore, quite large differences may exist between the ideas of different social groups. Furthermore, due to institutional boundaries, it is difficult to reach a consensus. For example, on the question of exactly what state China´s national strength is in and what position in the international order China should pursue, the views of the different groups are very far apart. Even inside the political and academic elites, it seems difficult to reach a consensus on this question and difficult to develop long-term stable strategies. So, on the international stage, China generally can only respond passively with short-term tactics, and is unable to actively pursue its own clear goals. Viewed the other way, in its turn, this condition of China´s breeds confusion and suspicion in the outside world.


And it is in just this regard, that the cool-headedness and confidence displayed in Xi Jinping´s visit to the United States allows one to perhaps retain some kind of optimism about the future relationship between China and the international order. Whether or not the future international order remains stable will depend on whether or not China and its readjustment strategies are wise, and this in turn will depend on whether or not China´s leaders have a long-term perspective, which will depend on whether or not the elites can crystallise a consensus, and from there within the next twenty or thirty years see a goal through from start to finish. Put another way, the maintenance and optimisation of the international order will depend on the mentality of the Chinese, and cool-headedness and confidence are a good start.

子曰:“上好仁,则下之为仁争先人。故长民者章志、贞教、尊仁,以子爱百姓;民致行己以说其上矣。《诗》云:‘有梏德行,四国顺之。’”

Übersetzung James Legge

The Master said, 'When superiors are fond of showing their humanity, inferiors strive to outstrip one another in their practice of it. Therefore those who preside over the people should cherish the clearest aims and give the most correct lessons, honouring the requirement of their humanity by loving the people as their sons; then the people will use their utmost efforts with themselves to please their superiors. It is said in the Book of Poetry (III, iii, ode 2, 2), "Where from true virtue actions spring, All their obedient homage bring."'

Yi Jing 易經 蒙 Meng Die Jungendtorheit

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初六:發蒙,利用刑人,用說桎梏,以往吝。


Richard Wilhelm

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Anfangs eine Sechs bedeutet: Um den Toren zu entwickeln, ist es fördernd, den Menschen in Zucht zu nehmen. Man soll die Fesseln abnehmen. So weitermachen bringt Beschämung.

James Legge

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The first SIX, divided, (has respect to) the dispelling of ignorance. It will be advantageous to use punishment (for that purpose), and to remove the shackles (from the mind). But going on in that way (of punishment) will give occasion for regret.

偃师二里头遗址规模之大是远古黄河流域前所未见的,也是同期考古文化中没有的。它坐落于广大的二里头文化区域的地理中心,可以视为夏代的一座都邑或大型城市。已确认有一、二号两座宫殿,另在二号宫殿北墙还有第四期增修的一处同等大小的六号基址。此二处宫殿建筑群体现出中轴线的布局。一号宫殿略呈正方形,缺东北一角,东西总宽96.2米、南北总长107米,占地总面积9585平方米。主殿堂位于夯土台基北部,坐北朝南,面阔8间、进深3间。四周由墙壁相围,内有廊庑行道,东墙有一侧房。中轴线正南面有敞开的大门,分为三个门道,北部、东部各有一侧门。二号宫殿东西宽58米,南北长72.8米,有四面围墙和东、南、西三面回廊。主体殿堂夯土台基有3米厚度。一、二号宫殿都拥有陶制的排水管道,而二号的设施保存的相对完整。管道由多节圆形陶管连接构成。每节直径在16.5至22厘米间,长52至58厘米,壁厚约2厘米,置于预先挖好的约一米深的地下土沟槽内,以防止渗水。厚达5至7厘米的石板架于沟槽、陶管之上,以防止行人压裂陶管。管道呈西高东低的趋势,通过落差将宫殿庭院内的雨水排出到院外。宫殿区以外有纵横交错的土路、作坊以及夯土城墙。

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