Vokabeltexte Chinesisch/ Vokabellektionen/ Lektion 794

Zurück zu Lektion 793 | Hoch zum Buch Vokabellektionen | Vor zu Lektion 795

Zeichen

Zeichen	Pinyin	Übersetzung	Lernhilfen
皖	wan3	alter Staat Wan, Wan-Berg, Wan-Fluß	wiktionary Etymologie:
撑	cheng1	(ab)stützen, staken, aufhalten, (mühsam) aufrechterhalten, aufspannen, (brechend) voll sein, vollstopfen	wiktionary Etymologie:
柴	chai2	Brennholz	wiktionary Etymologie:
逡	qun1, xun4, suo1	zurückziehen	wiktionary Etymologie:
涌	yong3	auf-/hoch-/emporsteigen, fluten, strömen, vorwärtsdrängen, sprudeln, hervorquellen	wiktionary Etymologie:
	chong1	Nebenfluß, Flußarm

Zusammengesetzte Wörter

皖

Zeichen	Pinyin	Übersetzung
皖鱼	wan3 yu2	Wan-Fisch
皖魚	wan3 yu2	(traditionelle Schreibweise von 皖鱼), Wan-Fisch
竹简皖鱼	zhu2 jian3 wan3 yu2	„Bambustäfelchen“-Wan-Fisch
香竹皖鱼	xiang1 zhu2 wan3 yu2	Duftender Bambus-Wan-Fisch
香竹皖魚	xiang1 zhu2 wan3 yu2	(traditionelle Schreibweise von 香竹皖鱼), Duftender Bambus-Wan-Fisch
皖南事变	Wan3 nan2 Shi4 bian4	New Fourth Army Incident of 1940, involving fighting between the Nationalists and Communists
皖系军阀	Wan3 xi4 jun1 fa2	Anhui faction of Northern Warlords 1911-c.1929
直皖战争	Zhi2 Wan3 zhan4 zheng1	war of 1920 between Northern Warlords, in which the Zhili faction beat the Anhui faction and took over the Beijing government
皖系战败	Wan3 xi4 zhan4 bai4	Anhui faction of Northern Warlords (1912-c. 1920), led by Duan Qirui 段祺瑞 with Japanese support

撑

Zeichen	Pinyin	Übersetzung
裙撑	qun2 cheng1	Kiepe
支撑	zhi1 cheng5	sichstützen
撑竿跳	cheng1 gan1 tiao2	Stabhochsprung
支撑柱	zhi1 cheng5 zhu4	Stützpfeiler, tragende Säule
支撑住	zhi1 cheng5 zhu4	Abstützung
支撑物	zhi1 cheng5 wu4	Anhalt
俯卧撑	fu3 wo4 cheng1	Liegestütze machen, sich nicht um Angelegenheiten anderer kümmern
撑竿跳高	cheng1 gan1 tiao4 gao1	Stabhochsprung
撑杆跳高	cheng1 gan3 tiao4 gao1	Stabhochsprung
支撑得住	zhi1 cheng5 de2 zhu4	tragfähig
支撑装置	zhi1 cheng5 zhuang1 zhi4	Spreizeinrichtung
用支柱支撑	yong4 zhi1 zhu4 zhi1 cheng5	Gitterstab
用木材支撑	yong4 mu4 cai2 zhi1 cheng5	zimmern

柴

Zeichen	Pinyin	Übersetzung
柴山	chai2 shan1	Affenberg, Ape Hill (Hügel in Kaohsiung, Taiwan)
柴电	chai2 dian4	dieselelektrisch
柴電	chai2 dian4	(traditionelle Schreibweise von 柴电), dieselelektrisch
柴鱼	chai2 yu2	Katsuobushi
柴魚	chai2 yu2	(traditionelle Schreibweise von 柴鱼), Katsuobushi
薪柴	xin1 chai2	Brennholz
拾柴	shi2 chai2	Brennholz sammeln
砍柴	kan3 chai2	Brennholz machen, Brennholz sammlen und schlagen, Feuerholz machen, Feuerholz sammlen und schlagen, Holz sammeln und schlagen, Holz schlagen ( Feuerholz schlagen )
火柴	huo3 chai2	Streichholz
柴火	chai2 huo5	Brennholz
劈柴	pi3 chai5	gehacktes Brennholz
柴油	chai2 you2	Dieselkraftstoff
木柴	mu4 chai2	Brennholz, Feuerholz
柴堆	chai2 dui1	Holzhaufen
柴薪	chai2 xin1	Kleinholz, Feuerholz
引火柴	yin3 huo3 chai2	Kohlenanzünder, Kohleanzünder
火柴盒	huo3 chai2 he2	Streichholzschachtel
柴油机	chai2 you2 ji1	Dieselmotor
柴油機	chai2 you2 ji1	(traditionelle Schreibweise von 柴油机), Dieselmotor
生物柴油	sheng1 wu4 chai2 you2	Biodiesel
骨瘦如柴	gu3 shou4 ru2 chai2	mager
大柴旦镇	da4 chai2 dan4 zhen4	Dachaidanzhen (Ort in Qinghai)
柴门霍夫	chai2 men2 huo4 fu1	Ludwik Lejzer Zamenhof
柴門霍夫	chai2 men2 huo4 fu1	(traditionelle Schreibweise von 柴门霍夫), Ludwik Lejzer Zamenhof
柴田胜家	chai2 tian2 sheng4 jia1	Shibata Katsuie
柴田勝家	chai2 tian2 sheng4 jia1	(traditionelle Schreibweise von 柴田胜家), Shibata Katsuie
柴油马达	chai2 you2 ma3 da2	Dieselmotor
柴油车辆	chai2 you2 che1 liang4	Dieselfahrzeug, Dieselfahrzeuge
柴油車輛	chai2 you2 che1 liang4	(traditionelle Schreibweise von 柴油车辆), Dieselfahrzeug, Dieselfahrzeuge
柴油汽车	chai2 you2 qi4 che1	Dieselfahrzeug, Dieselfahrzeuge
柴油汽車	chai2 you2 qi4 che1	(traditionelle Schreibweise von 柴油汽车), Dieselfahrzeug, Dieselfahrzeuge
柴油机组	chai2 you2 ji1 zu3	Dieselelektroaggregat
柴油機組	chai2 you2 ji1 zu3	(traditionelle Schreibweise von 柴油机组), Dieselelektroaggregat
柴油发电机	chai2 you2 fa1 dian4 ji1	Dieselgenerator
柴油發電機	chai2 you2 fa1 dian4 ji1	(traditionelle Schreibweise von 柴油发电机), Dieselgenerator
柴油发动机	chai2 you2 fa1 dong4 ji1	Diesel, Dieselmotor
柴油發動機	chai2 you2 fa1 dong4 ji1	(traditionelle Schreibweise von 柴油发动机), Diesel, Dieselmotor
布拉柴维尔	bu4 la1 chai2 wei2 er3	Brazzaville
布拉柴維爾	bu4 la1 chai2 wei2 er3	(traditionelle Schreibweise von 布拉柴维尔), Brazzaville
堆积的柴薪	dui1 ji1 de5 chai2 xin1	Holzhaufen
增压柴油机	zeng1 ya1 chai2 you2 ji1	Lademotor
柴油发电厂	chai2 you2 fa1 dian4 chang3	Dieselkraftanlage, Dieselkraftwerk
柴达木盆地	chai2 da2 mu4 pen2 di4	Qaidam-Becken, Tsaidam-Becken
费柴尔德公司	fei4 chai2 er3 de2 gong1 si1	Fairchild
柴油发电机组	chai2 you2 fa1 dian4 ji1 zu3	Dieselelektroaggregat
柴油發電機組	chai2 you2 fa1 dian4 ji1 zu3	(traditionelle Schreibweise von 柴油发电机组), Dieselelektroaggregat
卖火柴的小女孩	mai4 huo3 chai2 de5 xiao3 nü3 hai2	Das kleine Mädchen mit den Schwefelhölzern
賣火柴的小女孩	mai4 huo3 chai2 de5 xiao3 nü3 hai2	(traditionelle Schreibweise von 卖火柴的小女孩), Das kleine Mädchen mit den Schwefelhölzern
柴科夫斯基大赛	chai2 ke1 fu1 si1 ji1 da4 sai4	Tschaikowsky-Wettbewerb
陆用柴油发电机组	lu4 yong4 chai2 you2 fa1 dian4 ji1 zu3	Landaggregat
陸用柴油發電機組	lu4 yong4 chai2 you2 fa1 dian4 ji1 zu3	(traditionelle Schreibweise von 陆用柴油发电机组), Landaggregat
大型四冲程柴油机	da4 xing2 si4 chong1 cheng2 chai2 you2 ji1	große Viertaktdieselmotoren
液力传动柴油机车	ye4 li4 zhuan4 dong4 chai2 you2 ji1 che1	dieselhydraulische Lok
液力傳動柴油機車	ye4 li4 zhuan4 dong4 chai2 you2 ji1 che1	(traditionelle Schreibweise von 液力传动柴油机车), dieselhydraulische Lok
船用柴油发电机组	chuan2 yong4 chai2 you2 fa1 dian4 ji1 zu3	Bordaggregat, elektrischer Schiffsantriebsdiesel
船用柴油發電機組	chuan2 yong4 chai2 you2 fa1 dian4 ji1 zu3	(traditionelle Schreibweise von 船用柴油发电机组), Bordaggregat, elektrischer Schiffsantriebsdiesel
柴油机驱动的动力车	chai2 you2 ji1 qu1 dong4 de5 dong4 li4 che1	Dieseltriebwagen
船用和工业用柴油机	chuan2 yong4 he2 gong1 ye4 yong4 chai2 you2 ji1	Schiffs- und Industriedieselmotoren
彼得伊里奇柴科夫斯基	bi3 de2 yi1 li3 qi2 chai2 ke1 fu1 si1 ji1	Pjotr Iljitsch Tschaikowski

逡

Zeichen	Pinyin	Übersetzung
逡巡	qun1 xun2	to draw back, to move back and forth, to hesitate, in an instant
逡巡不前	qun1 xun2 bu4 qian2	to hesitate to move forward, to balk, to jib

涌

Zeichen	Pinyin	Übersetzung
涌流	yong3 liu2	strömen
涌现	yong3 xian4	aus dem Boden schießen, aufkommen, auftauchen
涌現	yong3 xian4	(traditionelle Schreibweise von 涌现), aus dem Boden schießen, aufkommen, auftauchen
涌起	yong3 qi3	Anstieg
涌浪	yong3 lang4	feiner Herr
管涌	guan3 yong3	durch ein Rohr leitend
涌出	yong3 chu1	springen, vervorsprudeln
奔涌	ben1 yong3	(engl. to flow swiftly; surge)
浪涌	lang4 yong3	Aufwallung
潮涌	chao2 yong3	Brandung, Flutwelle
涌入	yong3 ru4	hineinströmen, hereinströmen
涌向	yong3 xiang4	überschwemmen, überfluten (Menschen einen Ort)
涌泉	yong3 quan2	"Sprudelnde Quelle": Akupunkturpunkt N1 auf dem Nierenmeridian
涌现出	yong3 xian4 chu1	hervorquellen
蜂起云涌	feng1 qi3 yun2 yong3	äußerst geschäftig
蜂起雲涌	feng1 qi3 yun2 yong3	(traditionelle Schreibweise von 蜂起云涌), äußerst geschäftig

Sätze

皖

Zeichen	Pinyin	Übersetzung

撑

Zeichen	Pinyin	Übersetzung
我们昨晚吃撑了。		We ate way too much last night. (Mandarin, Tatoeba bigfatpanda CK )
在一连串可怕的事件中,哥伦布曾经咬紧牙关撑过去。		In a horrifying chain of events, Christopher Columbus once bit his own lip. (Mandarin, Tatoeba Martha FeuDRenais2 )
大企业就算要倒闭了也会有国家撑腰。		Selbst wenn sie bankrott gehen sollten, kriegen Großkonzerne Stütze vom Staat. (Mandarin, Tatoeba slo_oth Yorwba )
他用手撑着下巴，听着。		He was listening with his chin resting on his hand. (Mandarin, Tatoeba sadhen Eldad )
这条绳子能撑多久?		How long will this rope hold? (Mandarin, Tatoeba Martha CK )
把千斤顶拿过来，我要把汽车撑起来。		Hol den Wagenheber, ich möchte das Auto aufbocken. (Mandarin, Tatoeba xjjAstrus dispy )
政府官员表示，没有证据支撑中国学生可能是无意中传播病毒的人的观点。		Regierungsbeamte sagen, dass es für die Ansicht, chinesische Schüler verbreiteten unbeabsichtigt das Virus, keinerlei Belege gebe. (Mandarin, Tatoeba slo_oth Yorwba )
汤姆撑开了他的伞。		Tom spannte seinen Schirm auf. (Mandarin, Tatoeba GlossaMatik pne )
绳子不够牢固，撑不住他。		Das Seil war nicht stark genug, um sein Gewicht zu tragen. (Mandarin, Tatoeba fucongcong Tamy )
日本的经济是由一群勤奋工作的大城市上班族支撑起的。		Japan has an economy that is supported by hard-working company employees in big cities. (Mandarin, Tatoeba nickyeow )

柴

Zeichen	Pinyin	Übersetzung
你有火柴吗？		Hast du ein Streichholz? (Mandarin, Tatoeba xjjAstrus cburgmer )
你有火柴嗎？		Hast du ein Streichholz? (Mandarin, Tatoeba xjjAstrus cburgmer )
他劃了一根火柴。		Er hat ein Streichholz angezündet. (Mandarin, Tatoeba Martha Dejo )
您有火柴吗？		Haben Sie Streichhölzer? (Mandarin, Tatoeba sysko MUIRIEL )
世界语的创始人柴门霍夫是一个眼科医生。		Zamenhof, Begründer der Plansprache Esperanto, war ein Augenarzt. (Mandarin, Tatoeba gonnastop Espi )
一位匈牙利的化學家發明了一種新的火柴。		Ein ungarischer Chemiker hat ein neuartiges Streichholz erfunden. (Mandarin, Tatoeba DaoSeng Yorwba )
他划了一根火柴。		Er hat ein Streichholz angezündet. (Mandarin, Tatoeba Martha Dejo )
干柴燒得旺。		Trockenes Holz brennt gut. (Mandarin, Tatoeba verdastelo9604 xtofu80 )
Ben学会了不用火柴就能生火。		Ben hat gelernt, wie man ohne Streichhölzer Feuer macht. (Mandarin, Tatoeba fucongcong Sudajaengi )
干柴烧得旺。		Trockenes Holz brennt gut. (Mandarin, Tatoeba verdastelo9604 xtofu80 )
再往火裡添些木柴。		Put some more wood on the fire. (Mandarin, Tatoeba Martha CK )
这根湿掉的火柴点不出火的。		This damp match won't light. (Mandarin, Tatoeba U2FS orcrist )
由于少了木柴，烟囱的火苗已经开始后继无力了。		Mangels Feuerholz begannen die Feuerzungen im Kamin bereits an Kraft zu verlieren. (Mandarin, Tatoeba fucongcong Yorwba )
这收音机不比火柴盒大。		Dieses Radio ist nicht größer als eine Streichholzschachtel. (Mandarin, Tatoeba verdastelo9604 al_ex_an_der )
最上面的抽屉里应该有一盒火柴。		In der obersten Schublade sollte eine Streichholzschachtel sein. (Mandarin, Tatoeba znc Yorwba )
燔柴祭天是一种古老的仪式。		Das Bratopfer ist eine uralte Zeremonie. (Mandarin, Tatoeba xjjAstrus Yorwba )
这个取暖装置用柴油作为燃料。		Diese Heizvorrichtung verwendet Erdöl als Brennstoff. (Mandarin, Tatoeba fucongcong xtofu80 )
柴门霍夫是世界语的创造者。		Zamenhof is the creator of Esperanto. (Mandarin, Tatoeba iiujik rkqb )
汤姆用尽了火柴，不能点火了。		Tom ran out of matches so he couldn't light the fire. (Mandarin, Tatoeba verdastelo9604 CK )

逡

Zeichen	Pinyin	Übersetzung

涌

Zeichen	Pinyin	Übersetzung
他的眼里涌动着泪花。		Aus seinen Augen strömten Tränen. (Mandarin, Tatoeba dericteng Miyako )
她的眼里涌出了泪水。		Ihre Augen füllten sich mit Tränen. (Mandarin, Tatoeba fucongcong Pfirsichbaeumchen )
人群从体育馆中涌了出来。		The crowd poured out of the stadium. (Mandarin, Tatoeba nickyeow CM )
她目睹爱犬在意外中离世，不禁泪如泉涌。		Sie vergoss viele Tränen, als ihr geliebter Hund bei einem Umfall starb. (Mandarin, Tatoeba nickyeow ELPHONY )
难民从整个国家涌来。		Aus dem ganzen Land strömten Flüchtlinge ein. (Mandarin, Tatoeba fucongcong Jens_Odo )
洪水涌到了窗户的高度。		Die Überflutung erreichte Fensterhöhe. (Mandarin, Tatoeba crescat Yorwba )
数以千计的人涌向了诺姆。		Tausende Menschen eilten nach Nome. (Mandarin, Tatoeba jiangliang Pfirsichbaeumchen )

einsortieren

Zeichen	Pinyin	Übersetzung
留得青山在，不怕没柴烧	liu2 de2/de5/dei3 qing1 shan1/shan5 zai4 ， bu4 pa4 mei2/mo4 柴 shao1	Solange uns grüne Hügel bleiben, brauchen wir uns nicht um Brennholz Sorgen zu machen.(Wiktionary en)(Chinesische Sprichwörter)
泪如泉涌	lei4 ru2 quan2 yong3	tears gush out as if from a spring(Wiktionary en)
铺霜涌雪	pu1/pu4 shuang1 yong3 xue3	Literally: blanketed with frost and piled on with snow; rapidly and continually increasing in number (Wiktionary en)
不会撑船怪河弯。	bu4 hui4 cheng1 chuan2 guai4 he2 wan1 。	Wer das Boot nicht lenken kann, macht die Flussbiegungen dafür verantwortlich. (Chinesische Sprichwörter)

Lückentexte

the marco polo project

我们是演员吗？

最近一段时间，总是有人问我：“你是个演员吗？”柴静的书最近卖得让人眼热，我们这个在全国加起来可能都不到几十个人的职业，成为了业界的热点。

话说我的确一直有个演员梦，没别的原因，也是因为眼热。

你看看那些 erfolgreich 男演员，在电影里总是和漂亮的姑娘换着法的谈恋爱。镜头一开，MM们就得对你 mit süßem Charme，Herzen brechend，自己太太看到你和美女耳 am Haar des anderen 厮磨，还不能有意见。

爽 teuflisch 了！

和这些演员相比，我们的工作简直就不是人干的。

电视做调查性报道，原本就非其所长。一个平面-Medium 的调查记者，有一百种方式接近真相，但是，对于一个电视 Show 来说，它只能光明正大，堂堂正正，在摄像机的记录下，完成对真相的接近过程。

每次，当我坐在当事人的对面，孤独感都会扑面而来。因为当镜头的提示灯亮起，就宛若在提醒当事人：“你有权保持沉默，但你说的每一句话，都有可能成为将来在法庭上的呈堂证供”。我知道，他们每个人都不是在帮我接近真相，只是自己的利益代言人和辩护律师。被采访者，只有义务给我设置一堵一堵的墙。

岁数大一点的人多数都看过《尼罗河上的惨案》，这部电影我看过至少十遍。电影中的神探 Paul，面对的所有的人似乎都在给他制造假象，他既不能刑讯逼供，也不能给对方许诺“坦白从宽，抗拒从严”，除了 diskreten 东张西望之外，他唯一的武器，就是提问。

摄像机赋予我们的唯一权利，也是提问。

你必须专注于被采访的每一句话，每一个表情，甚至包括他们的肢体动作。你必须判断哪些话他们是说给你听的，哪些是说给镜头听的。你必须让真相在辩解中，灵光乍现。

这一切，只能通过提问来完成。

你所有的提问必须一气呵成，摄像机关掉之后，你知道的一切都变得没有价值。它只给你后悔的权利，不给你补救的机会。你必须在零点几秒的时间里，决定追问的方向。

这是门艺术。只有深入其间，才能体会这个职业的挑战。

你必须调动一切能量，寻找信息，了解背景，分析材料，研究对策。否则，你将一败涂地，没有人能救你。

“有人说你们的工作就是照本宣科。你怎么看？” 有人问。

“我其实也一直在怀疑，古力和李世石前段时间下的那盘棋，就是他俩商量好的。”

“怎么讲？”

“那么大的棋盘，中盘大砍大杀，最后不多不少半目胜负。”

“你不觉得太假了吗？”我反问道。

新闻很多时候的确比戏剧还要精彩，但它的导演是我们自己。我们的节目也一样。

我周围的确有一个团队，但他们不是在我身后。因为我甚至不是这个团队的核心，我只是被大家推举出来走向12码的位置，去射一个决定比赛胜负的点球。他们会告诉我对方守门员的习惯，建议我左上角还是右下角。但他们不会指示我，必须怎么踢。——这是我的职责。

如果我是在冯小刚的指挥下进行采访，我的心理压力会小很多。因为我只需考虑这临门一脚是否符合剧本，而不是比赛的胜负。Unglücklicherweise，我没有剧本，如果我在墙的面前撞得头破血流，观众们就会说，这个记者赶紧去死。

尽管如此，这是一份值得献身的工作，你的报酬不仅仅包括工资，还包括一个个被精心掩饰的秘密，以及，让你理解人性和社会复杂的阅历和洞察力。

“如果不让你干这个，你想做什么？”——这个提问有点调查记者的意思。

“做个演员。”我真诚地说。“和章子怡、舒淇演对手戏。”

...

Wang Zhi'an

Übersetzung

Are TV hosts actors?

Recently, I’ve been asked, “Are you an Actor?” TV journalist Cai Jing’s recent book has been a big seller. Our vocation, which few people occupy has become the centre of discussion in the journalism industry.

To be honest, I have a dream about being an Actor. For no other reason than that I would enjoy the glory and fame.

Have a look at the famous male actors. In the movies, they keep going on dates with beautiful actresses. Once the camera’s running, the starlets start hitting on them with their gentle charm and their intriguing manner. Their star’s wives can’t even have a problem with on-stage intimacy.

How awesomely devilish!

Our jobs compared with Actors are nowhere near as exciting!

Investigative reporting is not the forte of TV stations. Investigative reporters in the print media have a hundred ways to get closer to the truth, but for a TV show they must get to the truth above the board and sporting with the cameras.

Every time I interview these people, a sense of loneliness overwhelms me. Because every time the camera starts, the blinking lenses of the camera tells these people. “You have a right to be silent but anything you say can be held against you in the court of law.” I know the fact that everyone I interview actually is not helping me approach the truth. They just represent their own interests and are their own attorneys. The interviewee’s only obligation is to make it harder for me to obtain the truth.

Older generations might have watched 《?Death on the Nile?》 I’ve seen this movie at least ten times. The people who Paul, the Detective confronts in this movie seem to create an illusion for him. He can neither use physical interogation like torture， nor psychological pressure like inducing a confession with a promise. Except for discrete observation, his only method to extract the truth is to ask questions.

The only right the camera grants us is to ask questions.

You must focus on every word, facial expression and even body language of the interviewees. You must judge which part of the words are spoken to you and which part to the camera. (You must read between the lines, the words that are addressed to you and those that are addressed to the camera).

All this has to be achieved through questioning only.

An uninterrupted sequence in questioning is essential. Information obtained once the camera is turned off is worthless. Once the interview is complete, it cannot be changed. You can always regret unasked question and imperfect interviews. During the interview, you must decide which questions to ask within one second.

This is an artform. Only when you have a deep knowledge or investigate deeply inside, you can experience the challenge.

You must activate all the energy to formulate a strategy. Otherwise you will be seriously defeated. No one can help you!

“Some people say, your job is to go by the book. What do you think?” some people ask.

“In fact, I also doubt that the Chess contest between Gu Li and Li Shi Shi was fabricated. It was planned from the very start.”

“Why?”

“In the middle of such an enduring Chess contest, there was a fierce battle. The game ended in a dead tie.”

“Don’t you think it’s way too fake?” I asked.

Sometimes the news can be more intriguing than a drama! But the only difference is that the Directors are ourselves.

We do have a team but they are not behind me because I’m not the core of the team. It is like a football game, I’m merely someone selected by my team members to do the penalty kick. The penalty kick is usually a critical point in the game but my teammates would just tell me the habits of the goalkeeper and advise me to shoot upper left or lower right direction. They cant provide anything more than this general advice. How I kick is up to me.

If I were to conduct an interview under the directions of Ma Xiaogang, I would be under a lot less pressure, because I would only need to consider whether or not final edits fit the script, but not the final result. Regrettably, I don’t receive the script. Even if I faced a wall and hit my head against it until it bled, the audience would just say “this reporter better hurry up and die”.

Still, it is worth devoting ones life to this work. Your compensation is not only a salary, it also includes a meticulously guarded secret, namely it helps one to understand complicated experiences and insights regarding human nature and society.

If you were not allowed to do this, what would you like to do? This question can help to determine reporters interests.

If I were an actor, I can honestly say that I would be able to play opposite either Zhang Ziyi or Shu Qi.

...

Julien Leyre website

This translation was completed during the 2nd Marco Polo Project translation race held in Nanjing on December 22, 2014. The winning team – whose translation is published here – consisted of Ammy, Che Yuan, Alex and JP Grima.

为什么中国没有文化崛起？

中国已经是世界第二大经济体。尽管人均国民所得仍然很低，不管从哪一个角度来说，中国已经创造了世界经济史上的奇迹。但是有没有文化上的崛起？显然没有。中国崛起了，经济生活富裕起来了，但既没有赢得国际社会的尊重，也没有使得本国的老百姓更幸福。

无论是内政还是外交，越来越多的人感到很生气。不过，这种现象实际上很容易理解。人们必须提问，除了经济实力之外，中国还能提供什么呢？能够提供给老百姓一种道德生活吗？能够提供给国际社会一种可供选择的文化或者价值吗？

答案是显然的。从内部说，经济上的崛起已经导致了全社会的道德危机。尽管社会经济的发展必然会导致旧道德体系的解体，新道德体系又是怎样的呢？没有道德体系，社会难以生存。从外部来说，das Fehlen 一种吸引人的文化和其所体现的价值体系，经济崛起往往被视为是非常可怕的事或一种威胁。中国也意识到了这点，因此也努力向外推销自己的文化。没有新的思想和价值，只好求助于孔子，办孔子学院；而孔子学院又被简化成学习中国的语言文字。无论是办孔子学院的人还是从事其它 Medien 传播的人都不知道，他们要传播什么样的文化和价值。

王 Gengwu 先生把今天中国的崛起称为第四次崛起。历史上，中国至少曾有三次被公认为地区最强大的国家，因此人们也把中国的再次崛起称为“复兴”。既然中国崛起过，人们可以从崛起的历史中学到很多经验教训，诸如国家是如何崛起的？又是如何衰落的？

根据王先生的看法，第一次崛起是从公元前3世纪到公元3世纪，即从秦朝统一中国到汉朝。在汉朝，中国的影响力到了朝鲜半岛和东南亚部分地区。汉朝周边的很多国家进口汉朝的商品和技术，主要是丝绸、纸张、陶瓷以及陆军和海军技术。在这个阶段，中国给人印象最深刻的是经济和文化。

汉之后的400多年里，中国四分五裂为几个动荡不安的小国。但7世纪唐朝的建立宣布了中国的第二次崛起。唐朝的影响力传播到了日本和东亚其它地区，维持了近300年，这时的中国完全不同于汉朝。唐朝的强大和其外在影响得益于其高度的开放。唐朝不仅文化上开放，政治上也开放，被西方学者称为“开放的帝国”。佛教的传播和北方游牧部落在中原定居，这两种影响的强大混合力塑造出了一个新的国家，显示出其高度的世界性。高度开放也迎来了一个贸易和工业不断增长的时代。来自遥远国度的商人和旅行者带来的新东西，不仅丰富了中国人的生活，而且对中国文化做出了贡献，由此造就了一个中国历史上真正的全盛时期。

1368年，明朝建立，中国由此实现了第三次崛起，持续了约400年。这期间，儒家思想重新被确立为统治者的正统思想。这与前两次相比要逊色得多，因为中国的政治文化开始变得十分保守。闭关锁国的政策导致国家江河日下。尽管明朝加强防御，仍不断遭到来自周边的侵袭，并最终被满族人所征服。虽然建国之初的清朝非常强大，而且更具侵略性，但在此之后的统治中却更多地延续了明朝的保守和闭关锁国政策，最终衰落下去。1840年，强大的英国进攻中国时，清政府统治下的中国已没有还手之力了。

Das Fehlen 创新气魄的崛起

今天中国的崛起，至少到目前为止，并不像汉唐，而更像明（清）朝。既没有汉那样的制度创新，也没有唐朝那样的开放和文化崛起。唯一和前面三次崛起相同的，是经济发展和随之而来的军事力量的增强。尽管经济因为全球化而变得相当开放，文化基本上还处于闭关锁国的状态，在拒绝接受普世价值的同时，又没有内部的文化创造力。

今天中国的崛起模式，有可能重复明朝的悲剧，即在国家真正崛起之前就开始衰落。明朝在体制和思想上的闭关锁国，使得中国失去了成为一个海洋国家的机会。明朝是世界海洋世纪的开端。当时中国无论从国家还是社会，都比任何国家都具备成为海洋国家的能力。郑和下西洋是国家能力的象征，而在东南沿海 “异常 wilde” 的“海盗”，则是民间海洋能力的象征。但没有思想的创新和制度创新，王权庇护下的巨大既得利益，würgten ab 中国通往海洋国家的道路。

文化崛起对一个国家的可持续发展的意义远远被低估。汉唐的崛起在于文化，其最终衰落也在于文化。如果文化不能崛起，必然对经济甚至政治产生严重的制约。从内部来说，没有思想的产生，就不会有制度上的创新，最终必然导致封闭和衰落。从外部来说，没有思想的产生，就不能提供有吸引力的文化和价值观。如果光有经济上的崛起和与之相关的军事化，就会被视为是“霸道”和“威胁”，从而恶化国际关系环境。

文化没有随着经济崛起，首要的因素是经济和文化之间的关联。尽管人们可以观察到经济和文化同时崛起的案例（汉唐），但也可以观察到经济崛起没有导致文化崛起的案例（明朝）。经济崛起和文化崛起并不存在必然关联，两者不是同一件事情。即使是没有经济上的崛起，同样可以有文化上的崛起。无论中国还是西方，很多伟大的思想和文化创造，都是在极其贫困状况下进行的。

文化崛起三个非经济因素

文化创造和政府分权、文化开放、文化人独立这三个非经济因素更为相关。三个因素中存在其中一个，可以决定文化创造的出现。分权和开放导致文化的崛起，这是中国历史的经验。历史上，每次分权状态出现，尤其是皇权衰落的时候，文化倒是呈现出复兴的情景。今天的人们并不希望通过国家政权衰落来获得文化的崛起；相反，人们大多希望国家政权的强大。一个强大的国家需要一个强大的国家政权的支撑。但分权和文化崛起之间的关系，的确说明了国家政权什么该管、什么不该管的问题。

中央集权和文化衰落也没有必然的联系。明朝的集权模式导致了文化衰落；唐朝的集权模式则走向了文化崛起。为什么？一是不同的集权模式，二是开放。明朝政权深入文化领域，国家政权掌控了文化，同时明朝又实行文化上的“闭关锁国”。唐朝国家政权基本上不涉足文化领域，唐朝的文化领域是很典型的自治形式，形成了高度自治的文化“市民社会”。同时，唐朝是一个开放的帝国，在文化全面向外开放的同时，能够把外来的文化整合进自身的主体文化。

一个更为关键的因素就是文化人的独立人格。如果人格是独立的，没有什么因素，包括专制和贫穷，可以阻止文化的创造。俄国是典型的例子。无论是沙皇还是共产主义专制，都没有阻止俄国知识分子的知识创造。俄国知识分子在专制下创造出辉煌的文学艺术、哲学思想。中国的文化人没能在专制下进行文化创造，与文化人对政府的高度依赖有关。中国历史上从没有出现过西方称之为“知识分子”的群体，即把思维创造作为终生职业的社会群体。

很显然，要实现中国文化崛起，关键在于调整政治和文化的关系。政府从来就不是文化创造的主体。要政府来创造文化纯属 Utopie。这并不是说政府和文化创造没有任何关系。恰恰相反。在中国的环境中，政府决定了文化创造的成败：

第一是政府权力的边界。唐朝的政府边界没有对文化创造造成巨大的阻力，但明朝和清朝的则 würgten ab 文化创造。今天中国的政府边界不像唐朝而像明清。中宣部和文化部的权力涉足到文化领域的每一个角落。多年来，这些部门没有实质性的改革，沦落成为一种简单的控制机制。政治权力对文化领域的全覆盖，也导致了文化领域的高度政治化和官僚化，使得最原始的文化创新基因完全不可能。

第二是政府的政策，政府支持什么和反对什么，都会对文化崛起产生深刻的影响。在国际层面，政府的政策在于开放还是封闭。开放导致唐朝文化的崛起，封闭导致明朝缺失文化崛起。中国的现象是，政府太多的资源被用于控制，太少的资源用于创新。即使投入创新的资源，也是政府认可的文化领域。但现实是，在任何社会，政府官僚很少懂得文化创新。

在中国最荒唐的现象是，政府对文化事业的支持经常走向反面，导致其所支持的文化事业的衰落。佛教领域是典型的例子。无论从政策上还是资源上，政府大力支持佛教的发展，结果导致了佛教内部的大面积的腐败。文艺、文学等文化领域也同样。其实，政府的支持使得这些领域不可避免的衰落，逻辑很简单：一旦这些群体可以通过依附政府生存，他们就失去了进步的动力，结果必然是衰败。其他国家也有政府支持文化事业，但一定是通过放权让专业人士来做。这种放权的方法不见得会导致文化的崛起，但也不会导向衰落。在中国，政府也会放权，但目的往往不是文化本身，而是通过政治方法来达到政治目的。

...

作者是新加坡国立大学东亚所所长，文章仅代表个人观点

Zheng Yongnian

Übersetzung

Why is Chinese culture not rising?

China has already become the world’s second largest economy. Although per capita income is still low, no matter what angle you look at it, China has performed a miracle in the world’s economic history. But is culture also on the rise? Apparently not. China has risen and it’s economy has become richer, but it hasn’t won the respect of the international community, nor has it made its people happier.

Whether it’s internal politics or international relations, more and more people are getting angry. However, this phenomenon is actually very easy to understand. We must ask: apart from economic strength, what else has China achieved? Has it given the common people a moral to follow in their life? Has it provided the international community with an alternative culture or an alternative set of values?

The answer is obvious. Internally, the economic growth is already presenting a moral danger to all society. Although social and economic development will inevitably lead to the disintegration of the old moral system, what does the new moral system look like? Without a moral system, it is hard for a society to survive. Externally, in the absence of an attractive culture and the value system it embodies, economic growth is perceived as fearful or threatening. China is aware of this, and therefore is making efforts to promote its own culture externally. Without new ideas and values, China turns towards Confuciusism, and established the Confucius Institute; but the Confucius Institute have been reduced to Chinese anguage learning centres. Whether it’s the founders of the Confucius Institute or other people working in the mass media, none of them knows what kind of culture and values they want to promote.

Mr Wang Gengwu talks of China’s current rise as ‘the fourth rise of China’. Historically, China has already been the most powerful nation in the region three times, so people talk of China’s re-emergence as a ‘renaissance’. And since China has already risen in the past, people can learn a lot from history, such as why countries rise, and why they fade.

According to Mr Wang, the first rise took place from the 3rd century BC to the 3rd century AD, that is in the period from the Qin dynasty to the Han dynasty. Under the Han Dynasty, China’s influence extended to the Korean peninsula and parts of South East Asia. Many surrounding countries imported good and technology from Han China, particularly silk, paper and ceramics, as well as military and navigation technology. At this stage, the most impressive things in China were its economy and culture.

During the 400 years that followed the end of the Han Dynasty, China fragmented into large numbers of small countries at war with each other. But in the 7th century, the Tang Dynasty hearalded a new age of ascension for China. The influence of the Tang dynasty extended to Japan and parts of South East Asia, and lasted for about 300 years. During this time, China was very different from what it was under the Han dynasty. The strength and influence of the Tang dynasty was connected to its high level of openness. The Tang dynasty was not just opened culturally, but also politically, and Western scholars have called it ‘an open empire’. The spread of Buddhism and the settling of nomadic tribes from the North in the central plains created a new country of hybrid strength, showing a high degree of globalisation. This high openness also ushered a period of growth for industry and trade. The new things that merchants and travellers brought from distant places not only enriched the daily lives of Chinese people, but also contributed to Chinese culture, and therefore constituted a real high point in Chinese history.

The establishment of the Ming dynasty in 1368 started China’s third period of ascension, which lasted for 400 years. In this period, Confucianism was re-established as the orthodox ideology of the rulers. This period is much less impressive than the previous two, because China’s political culture started to become very conservative. The closed door policy resulted in national decline. Although the Ming dynasty strengthened its defence, the country was still exposed to attacks from its periphery, and eventually conquered by the Manchus. And although the Qing dynasty was very powerful in its beginning, as well as more aggressive, but it continued the conservative attitude of the Ming dynasty and its closed door policy, and eventually waned. In 1840, powerful England attacked China, and the country ruled by the Qing Dynasty had no strength to resist.

The lack of the rise of the innovative spirit

The current rise of China, so far at least, does not resemble what occurred under the Han or Tang dynasty, but rather under the Ming and Qing. Neither can we observe the kind of institutional innovation of the Han, nor the cultural rise and opening of the Tang. The only point that resembles the previous three periods of ascension is economic development and ensuing increase of military strength. While the economy has become quite open as a result of globalisation, on the cultural level, the situation is basically still that of a secluded State, which refuses to accept universal cultural values, and at the same time shows no internal cultural creativity.

The form of China’s rise today may repeat the tragedy of the Ming Dynasty, whereby the country started to decline before it even started rising. The Ming dynasty closed off the country institutionally and ideologically, and China lost the opportunity to become a maritime nation. The Ming Dynasty marks the start of the world’s ‘maritime century’. At that time, whether from a national or social point of view, China had more ability than any other country to become a great maritime nation. Zheng He is a symbol of this national capacity, and the ‘especially rampant pirates’ of the South Eastern coast are a sign of its society’s maritime capability. But in the absence of ideological and institutional innovation, vested interests shielded by the monarchy strangled China’s future as a maritime nation.

The importance of cultural ascension for the sustainable development of a country has been greatly underestimated. The rise of the Han and Tang dynasty was cultural – but their ultimate fall was also cultural. If there can be no cultural rise, there is bound to be serious economic and even political restrictions. Internally, there will be no generation of new ideas, thus there will be no institutional innovation, eventually lead to the country isolating itself and declining. Externally, without the generation of ideas, no attractive culture and values can be provided. And if China only relies on economic ascension and ensuing militarization, she will be considered as a ‘threat’, which will negatively affect the ecosystem of international relations.

Economic ascension does not necessarily lead to cultural ascension. This is primarily due to the connection between culture and economy. While there have been cases of simultaneous economic and cultural ascension (in the Han and Tang dynasty), there have also been cases of economic ascension which did not lead to cultural ascension (in the Ming and Qing). There is no necessary correlation between economic and cultural ascension: the two are not the same thing. Even without economic ascension, there can be a cultural ascension. Whether in China or in the West, many great ideas and culture are generated under extreme poverty.

Three non-economic factors of cultural rise

Cultural creativity is more closely connected to three non-economic factors: government decentralisation, cultural openness, and the independence of cultural creators and thinkers. So long as at least one of these three factors exist, cultural ascension can happen. Decentralisation and openness lead to the rise of culture: this is the experience gained from China’s history. Historically, whenever decentralisation of power occurred, and particularly with the decline of the empire, we could see signs of a cultural revival. People today do not want to see culture rising caused by the decline of State power; a strong country needs the support of a strong state power. But the relationship between decentralisation of power and cultural ascension, has indeed shown what the state should and should not regulate.

Centralisation and cultural declined are not necessarily connected. The centralised model of the Ming dynasty led to cultural decline, but that of the Tang dynasty led to cultural rise. Why is this so? Firstly, the modes of centralisation differed, and secondly, they differed in their degree of openness. The Ming Dynasty regime was deeply involved in the cultural field, and State power had a high level of control over culture. At the same time, the Ming dynasty imposed a cultural ‘closed-door policy’. The Tang dynasty State power was basically not involved in the cultural field, the cultural field under the Tang dynasty was typically autonomous, and a cultural ‘civil society’ with a high degree of autonomy was formed. Meanwhile, the Tang dynasty was an open empire, its culture was entirely open to the outside, and it was able to integrate elements of foreign culture into its own system.

A more critical factor is the independence of the personality of intellectuals and cultural creators. If theirs personalities are independent, no factor, including tyranny and poverty, can prevent cultural creation. Russia is a typical example. Neither Tsarist nor Communist tyranny have prevented the creation of knowledge from Russian intellectuals. Russian intellectuals, under an authoritarian regime, produced brilliant art, literature and philosophy. The inability of China’s cultural creators to develop cultural creation under the tyranny is related to their high degree of their dependence on the government. China’s history has never seen the rise of a group called ‘intellectuals’ as the West understands the term, that is, as a social group thinking about the creation of knowledge as a life-long career.

Evidently, to achieve the rise of Chinese culture, the key is to readjust the relationship between government and culture. Government has never been the main body of cultural creation. To wish for government to create culture is purely utopian. That is not to say there is no relationship between government and cultural creation. Quite the contrary. In the Chinese environment, government has determined the success or failure of cultural creation:

The first point is the boundaries of government power. Government power boundaries under the Tang dynasty did not offer much resistance to cultural creation, but the restrictions of the Ming and Qing dynasty stifled cultural creation. The boundaries of the Chinese government today do not resemble those of the Tang dynasty, but those of the Ming and Qing. The powers of the propaganda and culture ministries allow them to be involved in every aspect of cultural creation. Over the years, there have been no substantive reforms to these departments, and they’ve been reduced to a simple control mechanism. Complete control of political power over the cultural field has led to its politicisation and bureaucratisation, making the most basic cultural innovation completely impossible.

The second point has to do with government policy, whatever the government supports or opposes will have a profound impact on cultural development. At the international level, the government policy can be open or closed. Open policies leads to cultural rise just like the Tang dynasty, while closure leads to cultural decline just like the Ming dynasty. The phenomenon we can observe in China today is that the government uses too many resources to control, and too few resources to innovate. Even if resources are invested into creativity, these resources are only allocated to aspects of culture that the government approves. But the reality is that, in any society, government bureaucrats have little understanding of cultural innovation.

In China, the most ridiculous phenomenon is that government support for culture often has the opposite effect, and leads to the decline of the culture it supports. Buddhism is a typical example. Whether through policy or resource allocation, government supports the development of Buddhism, but the result is large areas of corruption within the Buddhist religion. The same is true for visual arts, literature and other artistic fields. In fact, government support has led to inevitable decline in these areas. The logic of it is simple: once these groups can survive by depending on government, they lost the motivation to improve themselves, inevitably leading to decline. In other countries, the government does also support culture, but in a decentralised fashion, and by delegating the task to professional experts. This decentralised approach will not necessarily lead to cultural rise, but neither will it lead to decline. In China, the government also decentralises, but often the goal is not culture itself, it is to reach political goals through political methods.

...

The author is the director of Singapore National University’s East Asia Institute. This article only represents the personal views of its author.

Julien Leyre website

中国式大迁徙：何处安放我们的故乡

南都评论记者 张天潘

每年春节，都是中国人一次集体的回家的朝圣之旅，为了一家人的团聚，entfernte Gegenden、千难万 Hindernisse，都难以牵制回家的脚步。这或许是全世界独有的现象。中国人对于故乡的依赖，成为中国文化中一个难以无视奇景。最直接的体现是，关于故乡的诗文不计其数，“举头望明月，低头思故乡”、“近乡情更怯，不敢问来人”、“乡音无改 aber das Haar ist 衰”等等，思乡中总是包涵浓浓的 Melancholie、伤感，Heimweh 扑面而来。近些年来，更有“每个人的故乡都在沦陷”这样的现代化之 Heimweh。

在今年的春节期间以及春节之后，又 erhöht 一波对于家乡五味陈杂的思考和书写，同时也有了面对北上广，逃离还是逃回、大城市与小城镇孰优孰 unterlegen 的争辩。这些也都在给暂时放下工作 durchdringen 于浓浓年味的人们，带去难以 ringen 的现实提示：我们与故乡到底是什么的关系？为什么在哪里生活，会成为永不停歇的争论话题？中国式迁徙，何时能够得以安宁？我们的故乡，何处可以安放？

故乡：故去的家乡

诗人于坚的一篇写于2011年的文章《朋友是最后的故乡》这个春节在微信朋友圈流传甚广，引起诸多人的共鸣。他在文中说到：故乡不再是我的在场，只是一种记忆，这种记忆最活跃的部分是朋友们保管着。记忆 aufwecken 的是存在感，是乡音、往事、人生的种种细节、个人史、经验。如今，只有在老朋友那里才可以复苏记忆。中国世界焕然一新，日益密集的摩天大楼、高速公路，令文章无言以对。但朋友是旧的，朋友无法被拆迁，许多老朋友，也还坚持着“抽象理想最高之境”， unvermeidlich 是，己所不欲强加于人的恶行时有发生；路遥知马力，日久见人心，朋友继续故乡遗风，“止于礼”“止于至善”，像刘关张那样肝胆相照，言行一致，说着母语，时刻准备为朋友 sich zu opfern。

事实上，于坚说出了一个很多人 halten 在中心迟迟没有去 entdeckt 的真相，其实人们与故乡之间千言万语的 Gefühle，本质上只是寄托在微弱的载体之上的。由此，也引起“亲人是唯一的故乡”等真实的 gezeigte Emotionen，道尽了故乡与内心中的真实联系。这也说明，在这个已经被现代化与城市化裹挟的时代进程里，人们与故乡之间的藕丝，其实已经越来越微弱了，亲友等线索，成为最后的游子与故乡的中介或 Medium。而如果这些中介或 Medium 一旦中断，那么这个故乡，或者就将成为已经故去的家乡了，被遗忘，被 weggewaschen。

这种真实的心理的 Entdeckung，在社会研究中来说，可能意味着更多。已故著名社会学家费孝通先生在《乡土中国》中说，“乡土社会是安土重迁的，生于斯、长于斯、死于斯的社会。不但是人口流动很小，而且人们所取给资源的土地也很少变动。在这种不分秦汉，代代如是的环境里，个人不但可以信任自己的经验，而且同样可以信任若祖若父的经验。一个在乡土社会里种田的老农所遇着的只是四季的转换，而不是时代变更。一年一度，周而复始。前人所用来解决生活问题的方案，尽可 kopieren 来作自己生活的指南。”

但是到现在，这种安土重迁——乡土中国的一个表征，也彻底反转了，中国人口流动已经成为全世界最频繁、数量最多的国家。故乡，开始被时代冲刷地日益 verblassen，不再是神圣不可疏离的圣地，或者说，它只是成为了旅游式的胜地了。

在频繁的流动与迁徙中，费孝通所说的这一套乡土生活运作模式和逻辑被剧烈地颠覆了。而一旦这种乡土中国的表征在退化，“故乡”这个很大程度上寄托于乡土中国之上的文化产物，也将会随之 verwelken。乡土中国的背后，是一种传统式的追求安稳、可预见、最具安全感的生存需求，年复一年，好像时间在乡土中是停滞不前。很显然，在流动的现代社会中，这一切都是不复存在的，变化、fremd、不可预见才是最显著的特征，时间在人们匆匆的脚步中，急剧飞逝。

如今，乡土中国的载体，随着农村的 Verarmung，已经慢慢缩到小城镇中，流动中国的载体，毫无疑问，是在大城市。于是，在乡土中国与流动中国之间，人们也遭遇的选择困惑 Problem，到底是具有更多中国传统的乡土中国式生活好，还是现代化与城市化之后流动中国的那种生活方式好？成为了众多人的一个纠结。

小城镇与大城市

刚刚出街的《南方人物周刊》封面报道就是“逃回北上广”，它说：马年春节过后，网络上关于大城市与小城市的比较与激辩，außergewöhnlich 喧嚣起来。无论是逃离北上广，还是逃回北上广，大城市、小城市之间的比较与取舍，以及由此带来的人群往返的 Tide，凸显的是一代城市谋生者安全感的 Mangel，“无根”的困惑。

在两三年前，迫于房价 Erhöhung、交通拥堵、环境恶化等大城市的各种工作、生活压力之后，很多的年轻人主动或被动地选择“逃离北上广”，形成一股返乡潮，返回二三线的小城市（随着中国城镇化的推动，“小城市”其实严格上应该称之为小城镇更合适，后文都将使用小城镇）。但在这一两年后，这些“逃离北上广”的人，经历了家乡诸如工作机会少、收入水准低、观念不合拍、人情世故繁杂等挫折与不如意之后，却又有很多人选择了“逃回北上广”。身在故乡为异客，反倒觉得自己的原先逃离大城市苦虽然苦一些，但却更自由和有发展机会，心情不像在家乡小城镇那般压抑。于是，家乡成为了回不去地方。

有人总结说：大城市拼钱，小城市拼 Familie。大城市的“拼钱”、小城镇的“拼 Familie”，体现的是两种文化形态与社会属性，拼钱是商业与资本为指挥棒的现代社会属性，拼 Familie 是以血缘等依托的乡土属性。小地方的安逸，有着乡土中国的安稳作为支撑，半熟人社会，关系网密织，网罗生长其中的人，有安全感。大城市是生人社会，在流动中，其是压力无法规避的代价，有着自由、机会，却少有安全感，明显地感受到贫富差距与阶层分化在自身形成的刺激。

在小城镇，个人被限定在先赋角色中（指建立在血缘、遗传等先天的或生理的因素基础上的社会角色），大城市中，有更多的机会，实现自致角色（指主要通过个人的活动与努力而获得的社会角色）。这一点，也很接近19世纪英国法学家梅因在其名著《古代法》中所指出的“身分与契约”的一个差异，乡土中国社会与现代社会的区分，接近于“身分社会”与“契约社会”的区别，也反应了从自然经济到商品经济（市场经济）、从“人治”到“法治”的进程。

大城市的自由与机会，更多的是法治与商品经济带来的人的解放（当然，也有拼钱的人的压迫），而小城镇的拼 Familie，则是自然经济（乡土社会的重要特征之一）、人治（讲关系和依靠血缘来分配资源）所 binden。

很显然，小城镇是乡土中国向现代社会迈进的未完成式，属于半乡土半现代的一个奇怪社会景观。也就是说小城镇，其实是乡村的放大版，同时也是城市的缩小版，它浓缩了中国的传统与现代，成为观察中国现代化最好的样本。可以说，在小城镇，是一个“杂交中国”：既有这现代化之后的物质与硬件，却还有浓厚的乡土中国的“差序格局”、着重人情世故，让有着优越先赋资源（拼 Familie）的人，获得异常的滋润与安逸，既能通过关系占据好的工作计划，还能够以此获得大城市能够享受的生活质量，早早地过上了有车有房的中产生活，甚至成为了令人眼红的“土豪”。但对于没有这些资源的人来说，则是难以 finden 到立足之地的黑暗角落。

对于较长时间有在大城市生活过却毫无资源依靠的人来说，相较之下，拼钱或许还让人更够接受些，至少拼钱，也是能有一定的个人奋斗与公平竞争的可能，拼 Familie 这种寄生于先赋的资源则毫无公平可言。于是，大城市与小城镇的 Vor- und Nachteile，本质上还是乡土社会与现代社会生活方式的一种比对，以及人们在这两种社会中的能否生存下去的问题，大城市不宜居、不让居，小城镇不易居、不能居，那么大迁徙就只能成为中国永恒的主题。

“中国式”迁徙

其实，不管是大城市与小城镇，在他乡与故乡之间，中国之所以能够每年都要发生人类奇观的大迁徙，还是在于人们难以融入所在地。奋斗多年，依然是外地人的 Verlegenheit，才是每年不得来回迁徙的根源；而资源配置、地域（城乡）差异，才是即 lieben 故乡，却又只能出走维持生计、无法守护家乡的根源。个体的命运，在这种大时代的背景下，一次最鲜明直白的映照，每个人都在其中找出自己的辛酸苦辣，不管是感性与理性，都在这种沉重的现实中，不得不开始 ängstlich。

改革开放之前，以户籍为标志的严格的城乡二元机制，牢牢地锁定了整个乡土社会的流动性。改革开放后，城市居民脱离了单位的全方位管辖，农村居民也摆脱了公社的无理 binden，在户籍制造的城乡二元格局的 Spalt 之间，开启了一场前所未有的社会流动。特别是这个拥有8亿多农民的乡土中国，随着迁徙和流动的约束逐渐减少，大量农村人口进入城市后，经历了市民化过程，在身份上由 rein 和传统的农民，向具有了更多现代性的“农民工”或“新市民”转变。二代农民工很多人已经实现了个人的市民化，个体上已经与城市居民没有明显的区别了，真正地实现了社会学家孟德拉斯所言的“农民的终结”。

但他们落脚城市，却依然难以在落地生根在城市。“人, die umziehen 活、树, die umziehen 死”，然而以户籍制度为 Fesseln 的中国式流动，往往成为一种令人 verlegen 的身份迷失，以迁徙的主体农村进城务工人员为例，从最初的“盲流”到“外来工”、“农民工”，在工不工、农不农之间，始终连最基本的身份融入都无法做到，犹如成为一片无根的浮 Entenflott，改革开放三十多年以来，我们已经亲身感受了社会流动带给社会的种种好处，但是具体在个体层面，这些流动的人员，却一直无法 ringen mit 身份的 Bindung，实现真正的自由迁徙，而且也限制着社会流动的最优化。

回顾中国人口流动的变迁，在人口流动的客观需和不愿彻底放开的共同作用下，各地均陆续出台了一些渐进的措施，设立 Schwellen，在学历上、个人技术能力上，实行了严格的规定，有条件地放开部分入户的可能性，以鼓励所谓合理的流动。但是多年下来，只有极少部分人享受到了这种政策，绝大部分人只有望洋兴叹的份，大量进入城市从事低端工种的人士，没有学历、没有所谓的技术，但对当地同样作出了贡献，却只能 lagern 在自由流动的边缘，难以扎根城市，特别是北上广，犹如 Hologramme。

机会与发展决定了人的流动，人口流动是社会发展的必然结果，有利于人才交流和劳动力资源配置和社会均衡发展。快速的经济发展必然产生大量的人口流动，美国、澳大利亚以及我国香港等地都是世界上人口流动量大，人员迁徙最频繁的国家和地区，同时也是经济高速发展之地。而再从社会学角度看，人口流动分为向上流动和向下流动，一个社会如果缺少这样可上可下的流动，变成 erstarrt 的社会结构，那么其危害性就是，轻微的冲击都随时可能导致这个社会结构崩盘。顺畅的人口流动能促进社会结构的不断地新陈代谢。

但中国目前这种迁徙，很多一部分是一种平行流动，人们在同一个社会阶层的领域里左右移动，或者说转移工作，职业等，保持社会阶层不变，无法完全从农民到市民的身份转变。因此，进入大城市的是拥有着自由了，但这种自由，却是个体身体上的自由，却没有权利上的自由。这也是造成中国每年大迁徙的根本原由，难以落地生根，才让中国在进入21世纪以后，不得不还保持着安土重迁的传统。

...

http://epaper.oeeee.com/A/html/2014-02/16/content_2020475.htm

Zhang Tianpan

Übersetzung

Great migration China-style: where is our hometown?

Southern Metropolitan Daily commentator: Zhang Tianpan

Each Chinese New Year (Spring Festival) is a collective pilgrimage home for Chinese intending on reuniting with their families. Though some of them must travel long distances and encounter all kinds of difficulties, their steps still irrepressibly take them home. This phenomenon is perhaps unique in the world. Chinese people’s dependence on their hometown is a marvel of Chinese culture that is hard to ignore. The most obvious sign of this is the innumerable quantity of poetry and literature that pertains to one’s hometown: “I look up and gaze at the moon, I look down and think of home”, “The closer to home the more timid I feel, not daring inquire about my family”, “The local accent hasn’t changed, but my hair is sparse and greying” etcetera. Thinking of home always comes with deep emotions, it’s nostalgia hitting one right between the eyes. In recent years, a more modern kind of nostalgia has emerged, along the lines of “everyone’s hometown is being overrun”.

During and after Spring Festival this year, a new wave of reflections and writings pertaining to the mixed emotions towards one’s hometown has risen again. At the same time, people faced disputes over the merits of big cities and small towns, no matter whether they were coming back from one or leaving for one. These situations also give those that have temporarily stopped work and are immersed in the New Year atmosphere a real prompt: What is the real connection between us and our hometown? Why is it that wherever you live, this becomes an unceasing topic of debate? When will Chinese style migration become stress-free? Where can we find our home?

Hometowns: Dead Homes

The poet Yujian in the unyielding 2011 article “Friends are the Final hometown”, which has been spread far and wide among circles of friends on Weixin, has resonated greatly with a lot of people this Spring Festival. In the article he says: My hometown no longer has my presence, it’s just a memory, the most active part of which is being taken care of by my friends. What my memory awakens is a feeling of presence, my native accent, past events, all kinds of details of my life, my personal history and experience. Nowadays, it’s only by having old friends that it’s possible to revive old memories. China has completely changed. Increasingly more skyscrapers and highways make this article unable to respond. However, old friends can’t be dispossessed. Many old friends still persist in “the highest place of abstract ideals”. What’s unavoidable is that when you have evil intent, it will make itself known: just as distance determines the stamina of a horse, so does time reveal a person’s true heart. Friends continue the legacy of one’s hometown by “following the etiquette” and “having a state of perfection”. Just like how Liu Guanzhang shows total devotion, practise what you preach, speak your mother tongue, and be ready at any moment to sacrifice oneself for friends.

In fact, Yujian has spoken forth the truth that many people have inside of them but haven’t explored. Actually, the many things people say to express their feelings for their hometown is essentially a weak medium. This gives rise to the expressed emotions such as “one’s close relatives are the sole homeland”, as the only real connection between one’s hometown and one’s innermost being. This also explains, in the course of this era’s modernisation and urbanisation, the connection between people and their hometown is actually already becoming progressively weaker. Close family and friends are like the thread that joins, becoming the final link or medium between those living far from home and their hometown. If these links or mediums are broken off, then many hometowns will perhaps become dead hometowns, forgotten and washed away.

This kind of real introspection, looking at social studies, maybe signifies even more. The famous late sociologist Fei Xiaotong in “Native China” said, “people are deeply attached to their local society, in which they were born, raised, and will die. Not only is the population pretty much stationary, but also the land that provides natural resources hardly changes. In this kind of environment that is indistinguishable from the unchanging Qin Dynasty, not only can individuals trust in their own experience, they can also in the same way trust their ancestry. All that an old farmer in his local society has come across is the changing of the four seasons, rather than the change of an era. Everything moves in an annual cycle. Our forebears’ plan for resolving life’s problems, as far as was possible would be to take a leaf out of their own books.”

However, up until now, this deep attachment to one’s native land, representative of Native China, has been thoroughly turned upside-down. The frequency that China’s population moves from place to place and it’s volume now stands at the world’s highest. Native places have started to be eroded away by the era, fading more day by day. They are no longer the holy lands that cannot become estranged. Rather, they have just become touristy scenic spots.

From the aspects of the frequency of population movement and migration, the model and logic of life in one’s hometown that Fei Xiaotong talks about have been severely undermined. In addition, as soon as this kind of symbol of Native China starts to degenerate, one’s “hometown”, this high level product of culture that entrusts the care of Native China, will accordingly wither. Behind the scenes of Native China, there is a kind of a demand for a traditional existence that pursues stability, predictability and safety.Year after year, it seems that in people’s hometowns, time is at a standstill. It’s very clear that in modern society where people move from place to place, everything has a temporary existence, changes, and is strange. It’s impossible to say what the most outstanding characteristic is. In the frantic pace of modern society, time is fleeting.

Nowadays, Native China’s medium, with the impoverishment of rural areas, has slowly retreated to small towns. However, the medium for mobile China is, without a doubt, consigned to big cities. Consequently, people are faced with a bewildering choice between Native China and mobile China. Is it better to have more a more traditional, Native China style of life, or is it better to have the modernised and urbanised lifestyle of mobile China? This causes many people to feel at a loss.

Small Towns and Big Cities

In the most recent issue of “Southerner’s Weekly”, the cover story is “Fleeing Back to Big Cities”. It says: After this year’s Spring Festival, the comparison and heated debate between big cities and small towns on the internet is uncharacteristically lively. No matter whether returning to or parting from big cities, the comparisons and decisions between big and small cities, as well as the resulting tides of people going back and forth, highlight the lack of security in the generation of those who make a living in the cities and the bewilderment of “having no roots”.

Two or three years ago, restricted to high housing costs, traffic congestion, environmental degradation etcetera, after enduring every kind of stress in both work and life in big cities, many young people either actively or passively chose to “flee the big cities”, forming a tide of people returning to their hometowns of second and third-tier small cities. (With China’s push for urbanisation, actually “small cities” more suitably should be called small towns, so the remainder of this article will use this term.) However, one or two years later, these people that “fled the big cities”, found that there were few work opportunities in their hometowns, income levels were low, people’s views were not in step with their own, they didn’t know how to get on etcetera. After feelings of disappointment and things not being in line with their own wishes, many people in fact chose to “flee back to the big cities”. As a stranger in one’s hometown, one unexpectedly feels that the big city that one fled, although a little trying, in fact has more freedom and opportunities, and one’s mood doesn’t feel suppressed like it is in one’s home in a small town. As a result, hometowns have become places that can’t be returned to.

Some people conclude: in big cities people strive for money, in small cities people strive for a good family. The “strife for money” in big cities and the “strife for a good family” of small cities embody two kinds of cultural forms and social properties. Striving for money is a property of modern society that has business and economics as its baton. Striving for a good family is a property of one’s native land that relies on one’s bloodlines. Cosy little places have the stability of Native China as their support. People in these societies are pretty familiar with each other and relationship networks are close-knit, with people who have grown up in them having a sense of security. Big cities are societies of strangers in which the price of having unavoidable stress when moving from place to place brings freedom and opportunity, but not a sense of security. One can clearly sense the disparity between rich and poor and the difference in hierarchy provoking oneself.

In small towns, people are limited to their original role, (social characters that have foundations established in the bloodline, heredity and other innate or physiological elements), whereas in big cities there are more opportunities to create one’s own (social characters that are obtained by one’s activity and hard work). This is also very close to the discrepancy “from status to contract” pointed out by 19th century British jurist Sir Henry James Sumner Maine in his masterpiece “Ancient Law”. The distinction between society in Native China and modern society is close to the difference between a “status society” and a “contract society”. It also reflects the process of the change from a natural economy (with a bartering system) to a commodity economy (market economy), and from the “rule of man” to a “rule of law”.

Most of the freedom and opportunity in big cities is a result of the liberalisation of people through the rule of law and a commodity economy (of course, there is also the oppression of those who strive for money). However, striving for a good family in small towns is bound by a natural economy (the main trait of local societies) and the rule of man (in which social relationships and bloodlines are relied on to distribute resources).

It’s very clear that small towns lie in the halfway ground between Local China and modern society, belonging to a strange society that is half local and half modern. In other words, small towns are actually at the same time enlarged versions of villages and shrunken versions of cities, concentrating both the traditions and modern era of China, resulting in the finest specimens in which to observe the modernisation of China. We can say that in small towns there is a “hybrid China”: having the material and hardware from modernisation, but also having the “disorderly structure” of a strong Local China that has the emphasis on knowing how to get on in the world. This allows those with superiority and resources (who have strived for a good family) to be exceptionally well off and comfortable. By means of their relationships they are able to maintain a good work plan, and also because of this they can enjoy the quality of life that is possible in big cities. Very quickly they surpass the middle class that have their own cars and homes, so much so that they become the “nouveau riche”, provoking jealously in others. However, for people who do no have these resources, it is difficult to find a foothold in the dark corners.

For people who are in big cities for longer lengths of time but completely lack resources to rely on, in comparison striving for money perhaps can be more readily accepted. At least with striving for money it’s still certainly possible to have a personal struggle within a fair competition. With the strife for a good family, which involves the coveting of already bestowed resources, is not in the least bit fair, it could be said. So, the pros and cons of big cities and small towns are essentially a comparison of the lifestyles of local society and modern society, as well as whether people can continue to exist within these two different kinds of societies. Big cities are not suitable for living in, small towns can be impossible to live in, and so mass migration inevitably becomes an everlasting problem in China.

“Chinese Style” Migration

Actually, no matter whether it’s a big city or a small town, each year the human spectacle of mass migration between a foreign town and a hometown occurs in China, and still it’s difficult amongst people to become integrated in a place. After struggling for many years, it’s still the embarrassment of people away from home that is the root cause of why they can’t migrate back and forth. Due to resource allocation and differences between the areas (city and countryside), even if one loves their hometown, one has no choice but to leave it to maintain one’s livelihood, and so one is unable to protect the origin of one’s hometown. In this era, the most clear and distinct reflection of individual destiny is that everyone must find their own unique style, no matter whether it’s emotional or logical. In this kind of heavy reality, one cannot but start to get anxious.

Before the reform was opened up to the outside world, taking the census register as the mark of a strict urban and rural binary mechanism, entire local societies were firmly isolated. After the reform was opened up to the outside world, city residents broke away from all jurisdiction of one’s workplace. Village residents also broke free of the irrational restriction of communes. From the crack in the urban and rural binary structure which was created by the census register, an unprecedented level of migration occurred in society. What’s special about Native China, which has more than 800 million farmers, is that along with the gradual reduction in restrictions on migration, after a large portion of the farming population entered the cities causing a transformation in city residents, their status transformed from purely traditional farmers to more modern “migrant workers” or “new city residents”. After the transformation in city residents caused by many second generation migrant workers, there was no longer a clear distinction between them and the original city residents, thus genuinely bringing about what Henri Mendras spoke of as the “the end of farmers”.

Although they settled in the cities, it was still difficult for them to put down roots there. “Moved plants die, but people who move survive”, however, Chinese style migration that had the household census system as it’s shackles frequently causes a kind of identity loss amongst it’s people. Taking the bulk of people who migrated from the villages to the cities and became workers as an example, from the first “blind influx” to “employed outsiders” or “migrant workers”, lying somewhere in between workers and farmers, from start to finish even the most basic blend of identity was impossible to assimilate, with them being akin to floating, rootless duckweed. In the 30 plus years since the opening up of the reform, we have already personally felt every kind of benefit that a mobile society has brought to society, but when specifically talking about individuals, these people that move from place to place never have any way of confirming their own status, thus bringing about an actual migration of liberty and a restriction to the optimisation of movement within society.

Looking back at how the movement of China’s population has changed, when combining effects of the objective needs of and the unwillingness to completely unleash a mobile population, step by step measures have successively appeared everywhere thus establishing certain thresholds. Strict rules have been set up regarding qualifications and individual skills and capabilities. There is also the possibility of land being released for new housing, in order to encourage a so-called reasonable movement. However, over a number of years, there have only been a very small section of people who have enjoyed this kind of policy. The vast majority of people have inadequate credentials, having no qualifications and no so-called skills, and so undertake lower-end jobs upon entering the cities. Although they devote themselves to the area in the same way as before, they can only linger at the edge of freely moving crowds. It’s difficult for them to take root in the cities, especially in the largest ones, as if they were just illusions.

Opportunity and development decide how people move. A moving population is the inevitable consequence of a developing society, being beneficial to the interaction of professionals and the allocation of the labour force as well as the balanced development of society. Rapid economic development inevitably produces a large population movement. America, Australia, as well as my native Hong Kong etcetera are all parts of the world in which there are large moving populations. Countries and regions which have the greatest frequencies of migrations of workers at the same time are places in which there is rapid economic development. Looking again from a sociological perspective, if a society lacks a population that is mobile on all skill levels then its composition will become rigid, the danger is that even a small disruption could at any time result in a collapse of its structure. Unimpeded population movements can promote the constant metabolism of a society’s structure.

However, regarding this kind of migration in China today, many parts have population movements only on certain skill levels, with people roughly on the same social stratum migrating, or perhaps changing jobs or professions. This maintains the current social structure, making it impossible to completely change one’s identity from a farmer to a city resident. Therefore, although those that enter the cities have freedom, it is only the freedom of one’s body, not the freedom of one’s rights. This is also the cause of the fundamental reason for China’s annual mass migration; the fact that it’s difficult to take root. After entering the 21st century, this has given China no choice but to maintain the tradition of begrudging leaving place where one has lived for a long time.

...

http://epaper.oeeee.com/A/html/2014-02/16/content_2020475.htm

Julien Leyre website

为什么中国没有文化崛起？

中国已经是世界第二大经济体。尽管人均国民所得仍然很低，不管从哪一个角度来说，中国已经创造了世界经济史上的奇迹。但是有没有文化上的崛起？显然没有。中国崛起了，经济生活富裕起来了，但既没有赢得国际社会的尊重，也没有使得本国的老百姓更幸福。

无论是内政还是外交，越来越多的人感到很生气。不过，这种现象实际上很容易理解。人们必须提问，除了经济实力之外，中国还能提供什么呢？能够提供给老百姓一种道德生活吗？能够提供给国际社会一种可供选择的文化或者价值吗？

答案是显然的。从内部说，经济上的崛起已经导致了全社会的道德危机。尽管社会经济的发展必然会导致旧道德体系的解体，新道德体系又是怎样的呢？没有道德体系，社会难以生存。从外部来说，das Fehlen 一种吸引人的文化和其所体现的价值体系，经济崛起往往被视为是非常可怕的事或一种威胁。中国也意识到了这点，因此也努力向外推销自己的文化。没有新的思想和价值，只好求助于孔子，办孔子学院；而孔子学院又被简化成学习中国的语言文字。无论是办孔子学院的人还是从事其它媒体传播的人都不知道，他们要传播什么样的文化和价值。

王 Gengwu 先生把今天中国的崛起称为第四次崛起。历史上，中国至少曾有三次被公认为地区最强大的国家，因此人们也把中国的再次崛起称为“复兴”。既然中国崛起过，人们可以从崛起的历史中学到很多经验教训，诸如国家是如何崛起的？又是如何衰落的？

根据王先生的看法，第一次崛起是从公元前3世纪到公元3世纪，即从秦朝统一中国到汉朝。在汉朝，中国的影响力到了朝鲜半岛和东南亚部分地区。汉朝周边的很多国家进口汉朝的商品和技术，主要是丝绸、纸张、陶瓷以及陆军和海军技术。在这个阶段，中国给人印象最深刻的是经济和文化。

汉之后的400多年里，中国四分五裂为几个动荡不安的小国。但7世纪唐朝的建立宣布了中国的第二次崛起。唐朝的影响力传播到了日本和东亚其它地区，维持了近300年，这时的中国完全不同于汉朝。唐朝的强大和其外在影响得益于其高度的开放。唐朝不仅文化上开放，政治上也开放，被西方学者称为“开放的帝国”。佛教的传播和北方游牧部落在中原定居，这两种影响的强大混合力塑造出了一个新的国家，显示出其高度的世界性。高度开放也迎来了一个贸易和工业不断增长的时代。来自遥远国度的商人和旅行者带来的新东西，不仅丰富了中国人的生活，而且对中国文化做出了贡献，由此造就了一个中国历史上真正的全盛时期。

1368年，明朝建立，中国由此实现了第三次崛起，持续了约400年。这期间，儒家思想重新被确立为统治者的正统思想。这与前两次相比要逊色得多，因为中国的政治文化开始变得十分保守。闭关锁国的政策导致国家江河日下。尽管明朝加强防御，仍不断遭到来自周边的侵袭，并最终被满族人所征服。虽然建国之初的清朝非常强大，而且更具侵略性，但在此之后的统治中却更多地延续了明朝的保守和闭关锁国政策，最终衰落下去。1840年，强大的英国进攻中国时，清政府统治下的中国已没有还手之力了。

Das Fehlen 创新气魄的崛起

今天中国的崛起，至少到目前为止，并不像汉唐，而更像明（清）朝。既没有汉那样的制度创新，也没有唐朝那样的开放和文化崛起。唯一和前面三次崛起相同的，是经济发展和随之而来的军事力量的增强。尽管经济因为全球化而变得相当开放，文化基本上还处于闭关锁国的状态，在拒绝接受普世价值的同时，又没有内部的文化创造力。

今天中国的崛起模式，有可能重复明朝的悲剧，即在国家真正崛起之前就开始衰落。明朝在体制和思想上的闭关锁国，使得中国失去了成为一个海洋国家的机会。明朝是世界海洋世纪的开端。当时中国无论从国家还是社会，都比任何国家都具备成为海洋国家的能力。郑和下西洋是国家能力的象征，而在东南沿海 “异常 wilde” 的“海盗”，则是民间海洋能力的象征。但没有思想的创新和制度创新，王权庇护下的巨大既得利益，würgten ab 中国通往海洋国家的道路。

文化崛起对一个国家的可持续发展的意义远远被低估。汉唐的崛起在于文化，其最终衰落也在于文化。如果文化不能崛起，必然对经济甚至政治产生严重的制约。从内部来说，没有思想的产生，就不会有制度上的创新，最终必然导致封闭和衰落。从外部来说，没有思想的产生，就不能提供有吸引力的文化和价值观。如果光有经济上的崛起和与之相关的军事化，就会被视为是“霸道”和“威胁”，从而恶化国际关系环境。

文化没有随着经济崛起，首要的因素是经济和文化之间的关联。尽管人们可以观察到经济和文化同时崛起的案例（汉唐），但也可以观察到经济崛起没有导致文化崛起的案例（明朝）。经济崛起和文化崛起并不存在必然关联，两者不是同一件事情。即使是没有经济上的崛起，同样可以有文化上的崛起。无论中国还是西方，很多伟大的思想和文化创造，都是在极其贫困状况下进行的。

文化崛起三个非经济因素

文化创造和政府分权、文化开放、文化人独立这三个非经济因素更为相关。三个因素中存在其中一个，可以决定文化创造的出现。分权和开放导致文化的崛起，这是中国历史的经验。历史上，每次分权状态出现，尤其是皇权衰落的时候，文化倒是呈现出复兴的情景。今天的人们并不希望通过国家政权衰落来获得文化的崛起；相反，人们大多希望国家政权的强大。一个强大的国家需要一个强大的国家政权的支撑。但分权和文化崛起之间的关系，的确说明了国家政权什么该管、什么不该管的问题。

中央集权和文化衰落也没有必然的联系。明朝的集权模式导致了文化衰落；唐朝的集权模式则走向了文化崛起。为什么？一是不同的集权模式，二是开放。明朝政权深入文化领域，国家政权掌控了文化，同时明朝又实行文化上的“闭关锁国”。唐朝国家政权基本上不涉足文化领域，唐朝的文化领域是很典型的自治形式，形成了高度自治的文化“市民社会”。同时，唐朝是一个开放的帝国，在文化全面向外开放的同时，能够把外来的文化整合进自身的主体文化。

一个更为关键的因素就是文化人的独立人格。如果人格是独立的，没有什么因素，包括专制和贫穷，可以阻止文化的创造。俄国是典型的例子。无论是沙皇还是共产主义专制，都没有阻止俄国知识分子的知识创造。俄国知识分子在专制下创造出辉煌的文学艺术、哲学思想。中国的文化人没能在专制下进行文化创造，与文化人对政府的高度依赖有关。中国历史上从没有出现过西方称之为“知识分子”的群体，即把思维创造作为终生职业的社会群体。

很显然，要实现中国文化崛起，关键在于调整政治和文化的关系。政府从来就不是文化创造的主体。要政府来创造文化纯属 Utopie。这并不是说政府和文化创造没有任何关系。恰恰相反。在中国的环境中，政府决定了文化创造的成败：

第一是政府权力的边界。唐朝的政府边界没有对文化创造造成巨大的阻力，但明朝和清朝的则 würgten ab 文化创造。今天中国的政府边界不像唐朝而像明清。中宣部和文化部的权力涉足到文化领域的每一个角落。多年来，这些部门没有实质性的改革，沦落成为一种简单的控制机制。政治权力对文化领域的全覆盖，也导致了文化领域的高度政治化和官僚化，使得最原始的文化创新基因完全不可能。

第二是政府的政策，政府支持什么和反对什么，都会对文化崛起产生深刻的影响。在国际层面，政府的政策在于开放还是封闭。开放导致唐朝文化的崛起，封闭导致明朝缺失文化崛起。中国的现象是，政府太多的资源被用于控制，太少的资源用于创新。即使投入创新的资源，也是政府认可的文化领域。但现实是，在任何社会，政府官僚很少懂得文化创新。

在中国最荒唐的现象是，政府对文化事业的支持经常走向反面，导致其所支持的文化事业的衰落。佛教领域是典型的例子。无论从政策上还是资源上，政府大力支持佛教的发展，结果导致了佛教内部的大面积的腐败。文艺、文学等文化领域也同样。其实，政府的支持使得这些领域不可避免的衰落，逻辑很简单：一旦这些群体可以通过依附政府生存，他们就失去了进步的动力，结果必然是衰败。其他国家也有政府支持文化事业，但一定是通过放权让专业人士来做。这种放权的方法不见得会导致文化的崛起，但也不会导向衰落。在中国，政府也会放权，但目的往往不是文化本身，而是通过政治方法来达到政治目的。

政府和文化之间的关系，导致了双输局面。政府控制文化导致大部分人对政府高度依赖，结果便是文化的衰落。对那些想保持一些独立性的文化人，要生存和发展，唯一的办法就是和政府对抗，造就了另外一种与政府相对立的文化，也是一种过分政治化的文化。挑战政治现状成了这个群体文化创新的重要资源。很容易理解，这样的文化创新（无论是宗教还是艺术和文学）在中国本身不被政府接受，还会经常 marginalisiert，而在西方则被人们所叫好，把此称之为中国文化的崛起。如果从一个客观立场来看，无论是政府自己所从事的文化创造，还是为了反政治现状而从事的文化创造，都很难走向文化的崛起。

实际上，无论是政府方面的政治化，还是反政治现状的政治化，都在最大限度上制约着中国的文化崛起。政治本来应当只是社会的很小一部分，社会大部分空间是非政治性的。即使是集权和专制，只要政治权力具有边界，文化创造仍然具有巨大的创造空间。

毋庸置疑，如果中国要走唐朝崛起之路而避免明朝崛起之路，唯一的办法就是进行文化体制改革，把文化从政治中解放出来，从官僚体制中解放出来，把文化人从政治官僚过程中解放出来。只有“把权力关在笼子里”，中国的文化才能崛起。

作者是新加坡国立大学东亚所所长，文章仅代表个人观点

Zheng Yongnian

Übersetzung

Why is Chinese culture not rising?

China has already become the world’s second largest economy. Although per capita income is still low, no matter what angle you look at it, China has performed a miracle in the world’s economic history. But is culture also on the rise? Apparently not. China has risen and it’s economy has become richer, but it hasn’t won the respect of the international community, nor has it made its people happier.

Whether it’s internal politics or international relations, more and more people are getting angry. However, this phenomenon is actually very easy to understand. We must ask: apart from economic strength, what else has China achieved? Has it given the common people a moral to follow in their life? Has it provided the international community with an alternative culture or an alternative set of values?

The answer is obvious. Internally, the economic growth is already presenting a moral danger to all society. Although social and economic development will inevitably lead to the disintegration of the old moral system, what does the new moral system look like? Without a moral system, it is hard for a society to survive. Externally, in the absence of an attractive culture and the value system it embodies, economic growth is perceived as fearful or threatening. China is aware of this, and therefore is making efforts to promote its own culture externally. Without new ideas and values, China turns towards Confuciusism, and established the Confucius Institute; but the Confucius Institute have been reduced to Chinese anguage learning centres. Whether it’s the founders of the Confucius Institute or other people working in the mass media, none of them knows what kind of culture and values they want to promote.

Mr Wang Gengwu talks of China’s current rise as ‘the fourth rise of China’. Historically, China has already been the most powerful nation in the region three times, so people talk of China’s re-emergence as a ‘renaissance’. And since China has already risen in the past, people can learn a lot from history, such as why countries rise, and why they fade.

According to Mr Wang, the first rise took place from the 3rd century BC to the 3rd century AD, that is in the period from the Qin dynasty to the Han dynasty. Under the Han Dynasty, China’s influence extended to the Korean peninsula and parts of South East Asia. Many surrounding countries imported good and technology from Han China, particularly silk, paper and ceramics, as well as military and navigation technology. At this stage, the most impressive things in China were its economy and culture.

During the 400 years that followed the end of the Han Dynasty, China fragmented into large numbers of small countries at war with each other. But in the 7th century, the Tang Dynasty hearalded a new age of ascension for China. The influence of the Tang dynasty extended to Japan and parts of South East Asia, and lasted for about 300 years. During this time, China was very different from what it was under the Han dynasty. The strength and influence of the Tang dynasty was connected to its high level of openness. The Tang dynasty was not just opened culturally, but also politically, and Western scholars have called it ‘an open empire’. The spread of Buddhism and the settling of nomadic tribes from the North in the central plains created a new country of hybrid strength, showing a high degree of globalisation. This high openness also ushered a period of growth for industry and trade. The new things that merchants and travellers brought from distant places not only enriched the daily lives of Chinese people, but also contributed to Chinese culture, and therefore constituted a real high point in Chinese history.

The establishment of the Ming dynasty in 1368 started China’s third period of ascension, which lasted for 400 years. In this period, Confucianism was re-established as the orthodox ideology of the rulers. This period is much less impressive than the previous two, because China’s political culture started to become very conservative. The closed door policy resulted in national decline. Although the Ming dynasty strengthened its defence, the country was still exposed to attacks from its periphery, and eventually conquered by the Manchus. And although the Qing dynasty was very powerful in its beginning, as well as more aggressive, but it continued the conservative attitude of the Ming dynasty and its closed door policy, and eventually waned. In 1840, powerful England attacked China, and the country ruled by the Qing Dynasty had no strength to resist.

The lack of the rise of the innovative spirit

The current rise of China, so far at least, does not resemble what occurred under the Han or Tang dynasty, but rather under the Ming and Qing. Neither can we observe the kind of institutional innovation of the Han, nor the cultural rise and opening of the Tang. The only point that resembles the previous three periods of ascension is economic development and ensuing increase of military strength. While the economy has become quite open as a result of globalisation, on the cultural level, the situation is basically still that of a secluded State, which refuses to accept universal cultural values, and at the same time shows no internal cultural creativity.

The form of China’s rise today may repeat the tragedy of the Ming Dynasty, whereby the country started to decline before it even started rising. The Ming dynasty closed off the country institutionally and ideologically, and China lost the opportunity to become a maritime nation. The Ming Dynasty marks the start of the world’s ‘maritime century’. At that time, whether from a national or social point of view, China had more ability than any other country to become a great maritime nation. Zheng He is a symbol of this national capacity, and the ‘especially rampant pirates’ of the South Eastern coast are a sign of its society’s maritime capability. But in the absence of ideological and institutional innovation, vested interests shielded by the monarchy strangled China’s future as a maritime nation.

The importance of cultural ascension for the sustainable development of a country has been greatly underestimated. The rise of the Han and Tang dynasty was cultural – but their ultimate fall was also cultural. If there can be no cultural rise, there is bound to be serious economic and even political restrictions. Internally, there will be no generation of new ideas, thus there will be no institutional innovation, eventually lead to the country isolating itself and declining. Externally, without the generation of ideas, no attractive culture and values can be provided. And if China only relies on economic ascension and ensuing militarization, she will be considered as a ‘threat’, which will negatively affect the ecosystem of international relations.

Economic ascension does not necessarily lead to cultural ascension. This is primarily due to the connection between culture and economy. While there have been cases of simultaneous economic and cultural ascension (in the Han and Tang dynasty), there have also been cases of economic ascension which did not lead to cultural ascension (in the Ming and Qing). There is no necessary correlation between economic and cultural ascension: the two are not the same thing. Even without economic ascension, there can be a cultural ascension. Whether in China or in the West, many great ideas and culture are generated under extreme poverty.

Three non-economic factors of cultural rise

Cultural creativity is more closely connected to three non-economic factors: government decentralisation, cultural openness, and the independence of cultural creators and thinkers. So long as at least one of these three factors exist, cultural ascension can happen. Decentralisation and openness lead to the rise of culture: this is the experience gained from China’s history. Historically, whenever decentralisation of power occurred, and particularly with the decline of the empire, we could see signs of a cultural revival. People today do not want to see culture rising caused by the decline of State power; a strong country needs the support of a strong state power. But the relationship between decentralisation of power and cultural ascension, has indeed shown what the state should and should not regulate.

Centralisation and cultural declined are not necessarily connected. The centralised model of the Ming dynasty led to cultural decline, but that of the Tang dynasty led to cultural rise. Why is this so? Firstly, the modes of centralisation differed, and secondly, they differed in their degree of openness. The Ming Dynasty regime was deeply involved in the cultural field, and State power had a high level of control over culture. At the same time, the Ming dynasty imposed a cultural ‘closed-door policy’. The Tang dynasty State power was basically not involved in the cultural field, the cultural field under the Tang dynasty was typically autonomous, and a cultural ‘civil society’ with a high degree of autonomy was formed. Meanwhile, the Tang dynasty was an open empire, its culture was entirely open to the outside, and it was able to integrate elements of foreign culture into its own system.

A more critical factor is the independence of the personality of intellectuals and cultural creators. If theirs personalities are independent, no factor, including tyranny and poverty, can prevent cultural creation. Russia is a typical example. Neither Tsarist nor Communist tyranny have prevented the creation of knowledge from Russian intellectuals. Russian intellectuals, under an authoritarian regime, produced brilliant art, literature and philosophy. The inability of China’s cultural creators to develop cultural creation under the tyranny is related to their high degree of their dependence on the government. China’s history has never seen the rise of a group called ‘intellectuals’ as the West understands the term, that is, as a social group thinking about the creation of knowledge as a life-long career.

Evidently, to achieve the rise of Chinese culture, the key is to readjust the relationship between government and culture. Government has never been the main body of cultural creation. To wish for government to create culture is purely utopian. That is not to say there is no relationship between government and cultural creation. Quite the contrary. In the Chinese environment, government has determined the success or failure of cultural creation:

The first point is the boundaries of government power. Government power boundaries under the Tang dynasty did not offer much resistance to cultural creation, but the restrictions of the Ming and Qing dynasty stifled cultural creation. The boundaries of the Chinese government today do not resemble those of the Tang dynasty, but those of the Ming and Qing. The powers of the propaganda and culture ministries allow them to be involved in every aspect of cultural creation. Over the years, there have been no substantive reforms to these departments, and they’ve been reduced to a simple control mechanism. Complete control of political power over the cultural field has led to its politicisation and bureaucratisation, making the most basic cultural innovation completely impossible.

The second point has to do with government policy, whatever the government supports or opposes will have a profound impact on cultural development. At the international level, the government policy can be open or closed. Open policies leads to cultural rise just like the Tang dynasty, while closure leads to cultural decline just like the Ming dynasty. The phenomenon we can observe in China today is that the government uses too many resources to control, and too few resources to innovate. Even if resources are invested into creativity, these resources are only allocated to aspects of culture that the government approves. But the reality is that, in any society, government bureaucrats have little understanding of cultural innovation.

In China, the most ridiculous phenomenon is that government support for culture often has the opposite effect, and leads to the decline of the culture it supports. Buddhism is a typical example. Whether through policy or resource allocation, government supports the development of Buddhism, but the result is large areas of corruption within the Buddhist religion. The same is true for visual arts, literature and other artistic fields. In fact, government support has led to inevitable decline in these areas. The logic of it is simple: once these groups can survive by depending on government, they lost the motivation to improve themselves, inevitably leading to decline. In other countries, the government does also support culture, but in a decentralised fashion, and by delegating the task to professional experts. This decentralised approach will not necessarily lead to cultural rise, but neither will it lead to decline. In China, the government also decentralises, but often the goal is not culture itself, it is to reach political goals through political methods.

Relationships between government and culture have led to a lose-lose situation. Government control over culture has led to a majority of agents relying on government, and the result is cultural decline. For those cultural producers and intellectuals who want to retain independence, their only way to survive and develop is to defy the government, and this has led to the creation of an alternative culture opposed to the government – but this is also a form of politicisation of culture. Challenging the political status quo has become an important resource for this group of cultural innovators. It is easy to understand that a similar kind of cultural innovation (whether it is religious or artistic and literary) is not well accepted by government in China proper, and will often be marginalized, while people in the West applaud it, and call this the rise of Chinese culture. If we look at it from an objective standpoint, whether it’s cultural innovation led by government, or cultural innovation that opposes the government, both will hardly lead to the rise of Chinese culture.

Actually, whether it is the politicisation of government or the politicisation of opposition to government, all are largely restraining the development of Chinese culture. In essence, politics is just a small part of society, and most of social space is non-political. Even under authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, all political power has boundaries, and there is still a a large space for cultural creativity.

Needless to say, if China wants to go the way of the Tang Dynasty, and avoid that of the Ming and Qing dynasty, the only way is the reform of its cultural system, to liberate culture from government and politics, to liberate culture from bureaucracy, and to liberate cultural creators and intellectuals from bureaucratic processes. Only by ‘putting power in a cage’ will Chinese culture rise.

The author is the director of Singapore National University’s East Asia Institute. This article only represents the personal views of its author.

Julien Leyre website

Bibel

Apostelgeschichte Kapitel 28

Chinese Union Version	Übersetzung Rudolf Brockhaus (1856-1932)
我们既已得救，才知道那岛名叫米利大。	1 Und als wir gerettet waren, da erfuhren wir, daß die Insel Melite heiße.
土人看待我们，有非常的情分；因为当时下雨，天气又冷，就生火接待我们众人。	2 Die Eingeborenen aber erzeigten uns eine nicht gewöhnliche Freundlichkeit, denn sie zündeten ein Feuer an und nahmen uns alle zu sich wegen des eingetretenen Regens und wegen der Kälte.
那时，保罗拾起一 gewisse Menge 柴，放在火上，有一条毒蛇，因为热了出来，咬住他的手。	3 Als aber Paulus eine gewisse Menge Reiser zusammenraffte und auf das Feuer legte, kam infolge der Hitze eine Natter heraus und hängte sich an seine Hand.
土人看见那毒蛇悬在他手上，就彼此说：这人必是个凶手，虽然从海里救上来，天理还不容他活着。	4 Als aber die Eingeborenen das Tier an seiner Hand hängen sahen, sagten sie zueinander: Jedenfalls ist dieser Mensch ein Mörder, welchen Dike, obschon er aus dem Meere gerettet ist, nicht leben läßt.
保罗 nun 把那毒蛇, schüttelte es 在火里，并没有受伤。	5 Er nun schüttelte das Tier in das Feuer ab und erlitt nichts Schlimmes.
土人想他必要 aufschwellen，或是忽然仆倒死了；看了多时，见他无害，就转念，说：他是个神。	6 Sie aber erwarteten, daß er aufschwellen oder plötzlich tot hinfallen würde. Als sie aber lange warteten und sahen, daß ihm nichts Ungewöhnliches geschah, änderten sie ihre Meinung und sagten, er sei ein Gott.
离那地方不远，有田产是岛长部百流的；他接纳我们，尽情款待三日。	7 In der Umgebung jenes Ortes aber besaß der Erste der Insel, mit Namen Publius, Ländereien; der nahm uns auf und beherbergte uns drei Tage freundlich.
当时，部百流的父亲患热病和 Ruhr 躺着。保罗进去，为他 beten，按手在他身上，治好了他。	8 Es geschah aber, daß der Vater des Publius, von Fieber und Ruhr befallen, daniederlag. Zu dem ging Paulus hinein, und als er gebetet hatte, legte er ihm die Hände auf und heilte ihn.
从此，岛上其馀的病人也来，得了医治。	9 Als dies aber geschehen war, kamen auch die übrigen auf der Insel, welche Krankheiten hatten, herzu und wurden geheilt;
他们又多方的尊敬我们；到了开船的时候，也把我们所需用的送到船上。	10 diese ehrten uns auch mit vielen Ehren, und als wir abfuhren, luden sie uns auf, was uns nötig war.
过了三个月，我们上了亚力山大的船往前行；这船以丢斯双子为记，是在那海岛过了冬的。	11 Nach drei Monaten aber fuhren wir ab in einem alexandrinischen Schiffe, das auf der Insel überwintert hatte, mit dem Zeichen der Dioskuren.
到了叙拉古，我们停泊三日；	12 Und als wir in Syrakus gelandet waren, blieben wir drei Tage.
又从那里绕行，来到 Rhegium。过了一天，起了南风，第二天就来到部丢利。	13 Von dort fuhren wir herum und kamen nach Rhegium; und da nach einem Tage sich ein Südwind erhob, kamen wir den zweiten Tag nach Puteoli,
在那里遇见弟兄们，请我们与他们同住了七天。这样，我们来到罗马。	14 wo wir Brüder fanden und gebeten wurden, sieben Tage bei ihnen zu bleiben; und so kamen wir nach Rom.
那里的弟兄们一听见我们的信息就出来，到 Appii-Forum 和三馆地方迎接我们。保罗见了他们，就感谢神，放心壮胆。	15 Und von dort kamen die Brüder, als sie von uns gehört hatten, uns bis Appii-Forum und Tres-Tabernä entgegen; und als Paulus sie sah, dankte er Gott und faßte Mut.
进了罗马城，（有古卷在此有：百夫长把众囚犯交给御营的统领，惟有）保罗蒙准和一个看守他的兵另住在一处。	16 Als wir aber nach Rom kamen, überlieferte der Hauptmann die Gefangenen dem Oberbefehlshaber; aber dem Paulus wurde erlaubt, mit dem Kriegsknechte, der ihn bewachte, für sich zu bleiben.
过了三天，保罗请犹太人的首领来。他们来了，就对他们说：弟兄们，我虽没有做什么事干犯本国的百姓和我们祖宗的规条，却被 gefangen genommen，从耶路撒冷解在罗马人的手里。	17 Es geschah aber nach drei Tagen, daß er die, welche die Ersten der Juden waren, zusammenberief. Als sie aber zusammengekommen waren, sprach er zu ihnen: Brüder! Ich, der ich nichts wider das Volk oder die väterlichen Gebräuche getan habe, bin gefangen aus Jerusalem in die Hände der Römer überliefert worden,
他们审问了我，就愿意释放我；因为在我身上，并没有该死的罪。罪。	18 welche, nachdem sie mich verhört hatten, mich loslassen wollten, weil keine Ursache des Todes an mir war.
无奈犹太人不服，我不得已，只好上告於该撒，并非有什么事要控告我本国的百姓。	19 Als aber die Juden widersprachen, war ich gezwungen, mich auf den Kaiser zu berufen, nicht als hätte ich wider meine Nation etwas zu klagen.
因此，我请你们来见面说话，我原为以色列人所指望的，被这炼子 umgeben。	20 Um dieser Ursache willen nun habe ich euch herbeigerufen, euch zu sehen und zu euch zu reden; denn wegen der Hoffnung Israels bin ich mit dieser Kette umgeben.
他们说：我们并没有接着从犹太来论你的信，也没有弟兄到这里来报给我们说你有什么不好处。	21 Sie aber sprachen zu ihm: Wir haben über dich weder Briefe von Judäa empfangen, noch ist jemand von den Brüdern hergekommen und hat uns über dich etwas Böses berichtet oder gesagt.
但我们愿意听你的意见如何；因为这教门，我们 ist bekannt, daß 到处被毁谤的。	22 Aber wir begehren von dir zu hören, welche Gesinnung du hast; denn von dieser Sekte ist uns bekannt, daß ihr allenthalben widersprochen wird.
他们和保罗约定了日子，就有许多人到他的寓处来。保罗从早到晚，对他们讲论这事，证明神国的道，引摩西的律法和先知的书，以 Jesu 的事劝勉他们。	23 Als sie ihm aber einen Tag bestimmt hatten, kamen mehrere zu ihm in die Herberge, welchen er die Wahrheit auslegte, indem er das Reich Gottes bezeugte und sie zu überzeugen suchte von Jesu, sowohl aus dem Gesetz Moses' als auch den Propheten, von frühmorgens bis zum Abend.
他所说的话，有信的，有不信的。	24 Und etliche wurden überzeugt von dem, was gesagt wurde, andere aber glaubten nicht.
他们彼此不合，就散了；未散以先，保罗说了一句话，说：圣灵藉先知以赛亚向你们祖宗所说的话是不错的。	25 Als sie aber unter sich uneins waren, gingen sie weg, als Paulus ein Wort sprach: Trefflich hat der Heilige Geist durch Jesaias, den Propheten, zu unseren Vätern geredet und gesagt:
他说：你去告诉这百姓说：你们听是要听见，却不明白；看是要看见，却不 wahrnehmen；	26 "Gehe hin zu diesem Volke und sprich: Hörend werdet ihr hören und nicht verstehen, und sehend werdet ihr sehen und nicht wahrnehmen.
因为这百姓油蒙了心，耳朵发沉，眼睛闭着；恐怕眼睛看见，耳朵听见，心里明白，回转过来，我就医治他们。	27 Denn das Herz dieses Volkes ist dick geworden, und mit den Ohren haben sie schwer gehört, und ihre Augen haben sie geschlossen, damit sie nicht etwa mit den Augen sehen und mit den Ohren hören und mit dem Herzen verstehen und sich bekehren und ich sie heile."
所以你们当知道，神这救恩，如今传给外邦人，他们也必听受。（有古卷在此有：	28 So sei euch nun kund, daß dieses Heil Gottes den Nationen gesandt ist; sie werden auch hören.
保罗说了这话，犹太人议论纷纷的就走了。）	29 Und als er dies gesagt hatte, gingen die Juden weg und hatten viel Wortwechsel unter sich.
保罗在自己所租的房子里住了足足两年。凡来见他的人，他全都接待，	30 Er aber blieb zwei ganze Jahre in seinem eigenen gemieteten Hause und nahm alle auf, die zu ihm kamen,
放胆传讲神国的道，将主 Jesus 基督的事教导人，并没有人禁止。	31 indem er das Reich Gottes predigte und die Dinge, welche den Herrn Jesus Christus betreffen, mit aller Freimütigkeit ungehindert lehrte.

Texte

English and Chinese lessons:第二十课 论火

Zeichen	Pinyin	Übersetzung
1 火炉里添些柴禾 2 天冷的时候有火我们可以暖。 3 天气温和我们不用火那时我们不冷。 4 但是天不冷的时候也要用火煮我们的饭。 5 我们不能吃生肉必须煮熟。		1 Put some wood in the stove. 2 When it is cold, the fire will keep us warm. 3 When the days are warm, we do not need any fire; then we are not cold. 4 But if it is not cold, we use a fire to cook our food. 5 We can-not eat raw meat; we must cook it.

Wikinews 海地总理由于油价引发抗议而辞职

【2018年7月15日讯】

海地总理杰克·盖伊·拉丰唐星期六辞职，此前由于政府计划提高油价而引发了数日抗议活动。

拉丰唐向议会下院宣布：“我向共和国总统递交了辞呈”，并且证实总统已经接受了他的辞职。

海地局势自上星期处于动荡，政府宣布计划大幅提高汽油、柴油和煤油的价格。

这一决定引发的暴乱活动造成至少四人死亡。

政府决定终止提价，但是政治动荡导致议会下院星期六的不信任投票。

美国国务院由于海地的动乱局势发出了旅行警告。

Noch keine Übersetzung

Wikinews 中国公布《网络游戏适龄提示》

【2020年12月17日讯】

12月16日，中国音数协第一副理事长张毅君在2020年度中国游戏产业年会上发布《网络游戏适龄提示》团体标准。该标准是在中宣部出版局的指导下，由中国音数协团体标准化技术委员会立项，腾讯、网易、人民网牵头开展。

该标准将网络游戏分为三类，依次为绿色指示的8+、蓝色指示的12+、黄色指示的16+，还规定了标识符使用的基本要求，明确规定了标识符的下载渠道、展示时长、尺寸比例和更新频率，对有可能刻意模糊弱化标识使用和提示语的行为做了必要规范，以维护标识标准的权威性、统一性和实时性，此外还明确标识符的具体使用场景，即适龄提示标识必须安放在游戏产品的显著位置，包括但不限于游戏官网、客户端注册与登录节点、游戏付费界面和宣传视频与广告等，以突出标识在游戏产品中的能见度与可视性。

张毅君表示，围绕适龄提示标准，音数协将继续加强包括游戏产品分类标准、适龄提示评价指标、家长监护平台技术标准在内的标准化体系建设，为适龄提示标准的应用落地提供可靠支撑和保障。他还表示，该提示发布之后就进入试行阶段，中国音数协将做好宣传引导、贯彻落实、拓展升级三项工作。

不过这不是中国第一次提出电子游戏分级方案，2019年，人民网就已经开始起草《游戏适龄提示草案》，将游戏适龄范围分为“18+”“16+”“12+”“6+”四级。

Noch keine Übersetzung

Wikinews 埃及出现更多大规模示威 警方武装戒备

【2013年7月20日讯】

数以千计的埃及人响应穆斯林兄弟会的号召，涌上开罗街头，要求使总统穆尔西官复原职。

周五，在穆斯林兄弟会的据点开罗纳赛尔城，穆尔西的支持者在拉比亚.阿达维亚清真寺外再次举行了每日静坐，与此同时其他的支持者在开罗大学附近游行。

穆尔西的反对派也计划在历史悠久的开罗解放广场集会，令人担心两个对立派别之间可能发生冲突。

在埃及各地的其他城市，也发生了抗议和游行活动。

埃及军方警告说，不会容忍任何暴力行为。 他们星期五向首都开罗的各个区域派出了坦克和军队。 在一些地区，士兵们设置了铁丝网路障。

同样在周五，美国国务卿约翰克里在约旦与新的埃及外长法赫米通了电话。 埃及官员说，双方都希望埃及能重新过渡到民主制度。

Noch keine Übersetzung

Wikinews 埃及对立派系冲突导致2人死亡

【2013年7月20日讯】

埃及被罢黜总统穆尔西的支持者和反对者在尼罗河三角洲城市曼苏拉爆发了冲突，至少2人死亡。

星期五，埃及好几个城市举行了相互对立的抗议活动。

在开罗，成千上万的穆尔西支持者响应穆斯林兄弟会的号召，涌上街头，要求恢复这位伊斯兰总统的职位。

穆尔西的支持者星期五还在穆斯林兄弟会的据点开罗纳赛尔城的拉比亚.阿达维亚清真寺外再次举行了每日静坐，与此同时其他的支持者在开罗大学附近游行。

穆尔西的反对派也在历史悠久的开罗解放广场举行集会，加深了这两个对立派别之间可能发生冲突的担忧。

埃及军方警告说，不会容忍任何暴力行为。 他们星期五向首都开罗的各个区域派出了坦克和军队。 在一些地区，士兵们设置了铁丝网路障。

同样在周五，美国国务卿克里在约旦与新的埃及外长法赫米通了电话。 埃及官员说，双方都希望埃及能重新过渡到民主制度。

Noch keine Übersetzung

Wikinews 巴基斯坦塔利班派遣数百人到叙利亚参战

【2013年7月17日讯】 巴基斯坦塔利班指挥官声称在叙利亚安营扎寨并且派遣数百人同反阿萨德的逊尼派反政府军并肩作战。

巴基斯坦境内塔利班的高级指挥官这个星期将叙利亚反政府军称之为塔利班的“穆斯林兄弟”和“阿拉伯之友”。 一名指挥官誓言要发表巴基斯坦塔利班在叙利亚获胜的视频。

这并不是第一篇关于外国的逊尼派战斗者涌入叙利亚参与他们认为是针对什叶派穆斯林的圣战。 外国战斗者的涌入导致美国帮助叙利亚反政府军的努力复杂化，特别是因为它考虑将那些反抗阿萨德政府的叙利亚人武装起来。

可是，至少有一名巴基斯坦塔利班的指挥官已经否认在叙利亚安营扎寨的报道。 他告诉法新社说，只有少数的武装人员离开，进入叙利亚作战，而且那些战斗者大都是阿拉伯和中亚的战斗者。

Noch keine Übersetzung

Haenisch: Lehrgang der klassischen chinesischen Schriftsprache Lektion 88 泰山

我国大山颇多
最有名者
莫如泰山.
泰山在山东省.
山南有汶水
北有黄河.
山顶有日观峰.
游人多登之.
以观日出
遥见海水翻腾.
日轮涌出.
最为奇观.

Das Buch der Riten

Wang Zhi

天子五年一巡守：岁二月，东巡守至于岱宗，柴而望祀山川；觐诸侯；问百年者就见之。命大师陈诗以观民风，命市纳贾以观民之所好恶，志淫好辟。命典礼考时月，定日，同律，礼乐制度衣服正之。

Übersetzung James Legge

The son of Heaven, every five years, made a tour of Inspection through the fiefs. In the second month of the year, he visited those on the East, going to the honoured mountain of Tai. There he burnt a (great) pile of wood, and announced his arrival to Heaven; and with looks directed to them, sacrificed to the hills and rivers. He gave audience to the princes; inquired out those who were 100 years old, and went to see them: ordered the Grand music-master to bring him the poems (current in the different states), that he might see the manners of the people; ordered the superintendents of markets to present (lists of prices), that he might see what the people liked and disliked, and whether they were set on extravagance and loved what was bad; he ordered the superintendent of rites to examine the seasons and months, and fix the days, and to make uniform the standard tubes, the various ceremonies, the (instruments of) music, all measures, and (the fashions of) clothes. (Whatever was wrong in these) was rectified.

Yue Ling

是月也，命渔师始渔，天子亲往，乃尝鱼，先荐寝庙。冰方盛，水泽腹坚。命取冰，冰以入。令告民，出五种。命农计耦耕事，修耒耜，具田器。命乐师大合吹而罢。乃命四监收秩薪柴，以共郊庙及百祀之薪燎。

Übersetzung James Legge

In this month orders are given to the master of the Fishermen to commence the fishers' work. The son of Heaven goes in person (to look on). He partakes of the fish caught, first presenting some in the apartment at the back of the ancestral temple. The ice is now abundant: thick and strong to the bottom of the waters and meres. Orders are given to collect it, which is done, and it is carried into (the ice-houses). Orders are given to make announcement to the people to bring forth their seed of the five grains. The husbandmen are ordered to reckon up the pairs which they can furnish for the ploughing; to repair the handles and shares of their ploughs; and to provide all the other instruments for the fields. Orders are given to the chief director of Music to institute a grand concert of wind instruments; and with this (the music of the year) is, closed. Orders are given to the four Inspectors to collect and arrange the faggots to supply the wood and torches for the suburban sacrifices, those in the ancestral temple, and all others.

礼记-大传

Text

牧之野，武王之大事也。既事而退，柴于上帝，祈于社，设奠于牧室。遂率天下诸侯，执豆笾，逡奔走；追王大王亶父、王季历、文王昌；不以卑临尊也。

Richard Wilhelm

Auf dem Hirtenfeldvollendete König Wu sein großes Werk. Als er nach dem Sieg sich zurückzog, brachte er auf einem Scheiterhaufen ein Brandopfer dar für Gott in der Höhe. Er betete zu den Gottheiten der Ackererde und stellte Opfergefäße auf in dem Hause des Hirtenfelds. Dann begab er sich an der Spitze aller Lehensfürsten des Weltreichs, die Opfergefäße und Opferplatten trugen, eiligen Schrittes vor seine Ahnen und übertrug den Königstitel auf den Großen König Tan Fu, den König Gi Li und den König Wen, dessen Name Tschang war,

um nicht mit niedrigeren Titeln seinen geehrten Vorfahren beim Opfer nahen zu müssen ...

James Legge

The field of Mu-ye was the great achievement of king Wu. When he withdrew after the victory, he reared a burning pile to God; prayed at the altar of the earth; and set forth his offerings in the house of Mu. He then led all the princes of the kingdom, bearing his offerings in their various stands, and hurrying about, and carried the title of king back to Tai who was Dan-fu, Ji-li, and king Wen who was Chang - he would not approach his honourable ancestors with their former humbler titles.

中国历史

中华民国

19世纪末，辛亥革命元老中国现代教育奠基人何子渊、丘逢甲等人开风气之先，排除顽固守旧势力的禁锢，成功引进西学，推广新式学校。清政府迫于形势压力，对教育革新网开一面，于1905年末颁布新学制，废除科举制，并在全国范围内推广新式学堂。1909年，地方科举考试停止以后，西学逐渐成为学校教育的主要形式。正是教育方式的这一根本性转变，为后来风起云涌的辛亥革命和国家建设培养造就了大批思想进步、锐意创新的社会精英和宝贵人才。

1905年中国同盟会成立以后，革命党开始兴起，孙文和黄兴等人在海外积极筹款，组建党组织，指挥国内的多次革命运动。经过十余次失败的革命起事后，与革命党互不沟通的湖北新军在武昌起事获得成功。1912年1月1日，亚洲第一个共和国中华民国在南京宣告成立，孙文正式就任首任临时大总统。2月12日，清宣统帝溥仪宣布退位，清朝正式走进历史，中国两千多年的帝王专制制度也基本结束。

在这个帝国和民国时代交替的时代，出现一大批学者，如康有为，梁启超，严复，王国维，辜鸿铭，章太炎，陈寅恪，吕思勉，魏源，钱穆，鲁迅等人，号称“国学”（中国文学，史学和哲学）。梁启超曾领导“史学革命”反对中国的传统史学，要求把“帝王之史学”改为“为国民写史”。严复曾翻译西方名著《天演论》以介绍达尔文的进化论，并且分析出中国由于不能冲破长期统治中国的儒家思想而远远落后于世界。王国维和辜鸿铭是著名文学家，曾游欧洲各国，后来结合自已的文化和西方思想写成好几部名著。章太炎是著名的反清斗士，他的思想随着中国的变革而逆转，成为著名的革命者和文学家。陈寅恪，吕思勉和钱穆皆是著名史学家，为“史学革命”做出卓越的贡献。魏源曾著《海国图志》以要求改革。鲁迅是中国现代文学的创始者，曾为章太炎学生，著《朝花夕拾》和《狂人日记》。这一时期，国外的各种新思想、新文化也开始慢慢传入中国，为后来1919年的五四运动爆发、1921年中国共产党的成立做铺垫，中国大陆的历史学家将五四运动，誉为中国现代史的开端。

Übersetzungshilfe

Es ist noch keine Übersetzungshilfe vorhanden

Zurück zu Lektion 793 | Hoch zum Buch Vokabellektionen | Vor zu Lektion 795