Vokabeltexte Chinesisch/ Vokabellektionen/ Lektion 875
Zeichen Bearbeiten
| Zeichen | Pinyin | Übersetzung | Lernhilfen |
|---|---|---|---|
闚 |
kui1 | (traditionelle Schreibweise von 𬮭), piepsen, gucken | wiktionary Etymologie: |
墉 |
yong1 | Stadtmauer, hohe Mauer | wiktionary Etymologie:   
|
咷 |
tao2, tiao4 | jammern, klagen | wiktionary Etymologie:  
|
粹 |
cui4 | rein, unverfälscht, auswählen, Essenz | wiktionary Etymologie: 
|
妣 |
bi3 | verstorbene Mutter | wiktionary Etymologie: |
Zusammengesetzte Wörter Bearbeiten
墉 Bearbeiten
| Zeichen | Pinyin | Übersetzung |
|---|---|---|
墉垣 |
yong1 yuan2 | city wall |
咷 Bearbeiten
| Zeichen | Pinyin | Übersetzung |
|---|---|---|
号咷 |
hao2 tao2 | 号啕[hao2 tao2] |
號咷 |
hao2 tao2 | 号啕[hao2 tao2] |
粹 Bearbeiten
| Zeichen | Pinyin | Übersetzung |
|---|---|---|
纳粹 |
na4 cui4 | Nazi, nazistisch |
納粹 |
na4 cui4 | (traditionelle Schreibweise von 纳粹), Nazi, nazistisch |
国粹 |
guo2 cui4 | Essenz chinesischer Kultur |
國粹 |
guo2 cui4 | (traditionelle Schreibweise von 国粹), Essenz chinesischer Kultur |
纯粹 |
chun2 cui4 | echt |
纯粹地 |
chun2 cui4 de5 | bloß |
新纳粹 |
xin1 na4 cui4 | Neonazi |
新納粹 |
xin1 na4 cui4 | (traditionelle Schreibweise von 新纳粹), Neonazi |
纳粹党 |
na4 cui4 dang3 | Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei |
非纳粹化 |
fei1 na4 cui4 hua4 | Entnazifizierung |
非納粹化 |
fei1 na4 cui4 hua4 | (traditionelle Schreibweise von 非纳粹化), Entnazifizierung |
纳粹帮凶 |
na4 cui4 bang1 xiong1 | Nazi-Kollaborateur |
纯粹数学 |
chun2 cui4 shu4 xue2 | reine Mathematik |
纳粹背景 |
na4 cui4 bei4 jing3 | NS-Vergangenheit |
納粹背景 |
na4 cui4 bei4 jing3 | (traditionelle Schreibweise von 纳粹背景), NS-Vergangenheit |
纳粹分子 |
na4 cui4 fen1 zi3 | Nazi |
納粹分子 |
na4 cui4 fen1 zi3 | (traditionelle Schreibweise von 纳粹分子), Nazi |
纳粹党人 |
na4 cui4 dang3 ren2 | nazistisch |
民粹主义 |
min2 cui4 zhu3 yi4 | Populismus |
民粹主義 |
min2 cui4 zhu3 yi4 | (traditionelle Schreibweise von 民粹主义), Populismus |
纳粹主义 |
na4 cui4 zhu3 yi4 | Nationalsozialismus |
納粹主義 |
na4 cui4 zhu3 yi4 | (traditionelle Schreibweise von 纳粹主义), Nationalsozialismus |
纳粹德国 |
na4 cui4 de2 guo2 | Nazideutschland, Zeit des Nationalsozialismus |
納粹德國 |
na4 cui4 de2 guo2 | (traditionelle Schreibweise von 纳粹德国), Nazideutschland, Zeit des Nationalsozialismus |
纳粹独裁 |
na4 cui4 du2 cai2 | Nazi-Diktatur |
纳粹党背景 |
na4 cui4 dang3 bei4 jing3 | NS-Vergangenheit |
新纳粹分子 |
xin1 na4 cui4 fen1 zi3 | Neonazi |
新納粹分子 |
xin1 na4 cui4 fen1 zi3 | (traditionelle Schreibweise von 新纳粹分子), Neonazi |
新纳粹主义 |
xin1 na4 cui4 zhu3 yi4 | Neonazi |
新納粹主義 |
xin1 na4 cui4 zhu3 yi4 | (traditionelle Schreibweise von 新纳粹主义), Neonazi |
纯粹理性批判 |
chun2 cui4 li3 xing4 pi1 pan4 | Kritik der reinen Vernunft(Philos) |
新纳粹党游行 |
xin1 na4 cui4 dang3 you2 xing2 | NPD-Aufmarsch |
纯粹时装化的东西 |
chun2 cui4 shi2 zhuang1 hua4 de5 dong1 xi1 | rein modischer Artikel |
国际纯粹与应用化学联合会 |
guo2 ji4 chun2 cui4 yu3 ying4 yong4 hua4 xue2 lian2 he2 hui4 | International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC, „Internationale Union für reine und angewandte Chemie“) |
纳粹德国同性恋史及大屠杀 |
na4 cui4 de2 guo2 tong2 xing4 lian4 shi3 ji2 da4 tu2 sha1 | Schwule während der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus |
妣 Bearbeiten
| Zeichen | Pinyin | Übersetzung |
|---|---|---|
先妣 |
xian1 bi3 | meine verstorbene Mutter, meine selige Mutter |
Sätze Bearbeiten
闚 Bearbeiten
| Zeichen | Pinyin | Übersetzung |
|---|
墉 Bearbeiten
| Zeichen | Pinyin | Übersetzung |
|---|
咷 Bearbeiten
| Zeichen | Pinyin | Übersetzung |
|---|
粹 Bearbeiten
| Zeichen | Pinyin | Übersetzung |
|---|---|---|
哀个发现纯粹是偶然。 |
Diese Entdeckung war reiner Zufall. (Shanghai, Tatoeba fucongcong Tamy ) | |
高德温法则告诉我们对任何主题的所有无休止的讨论会趋于和纳粹主义的类比。 |
Godwins Gesetz lehrt uns, dass jede unendliche Diskussion über ein beliebiges Thema gegen einen Nazivergleich konvergiert. (Mandarin, Tatoeba fucongcong MUIRIEL ) | |
我纯粹只是喜欢交朋友。 |
I really just want to make friends. (Mandarin, Tatoeba jjbraam ) | |
我去那个派对纯粹是为了交际。 |
I attended the party just to be sociable. (Mandarin, Tatoeba nickyeow Swift ) | |
纯粹数学是宗教。 |
Reine Mathematik ist Religion. (Mandarin, Tatoeba iiujik Pfirsichbaeumchen ) |
妣 Bearbeiten
| Zeichen | Pinyin | Übersetzung |
|---|
Lückentexte Bearbeiten
the marco polo project: 中国式大迁徙：何处安放我们的故乡 Bearbeiten
南都评论记者 张天潘
每年春节，都是中国人一次集体的回家的朝圣之旅，为了一家人的团聚，entfernte Gegenden、千难万阻，都难以牵制回家的脚步。这或许是全世界独有的现象。中国人对于故乡的依赖，成为中国文化中一个难以无视奇景。最直接的体现是，关于故乡的诗文不计其数，“举头望明月，低头思故乡”、“近乡情更怯，不敢问来人”、“乡音无改 aber das Haar ist 衰”等等，思乡中总是包涵浓浓的 Melancholie、伤感，Heimweh 扑面而来。近些年来，更有“每个人的故乡都在沦陷”这样的现代化之 Heimweh。
在今年的春节期间以及春节之后，又掀起了一波对于家乡五味陈杂的思考和书写，同时也有了面对北上广，逃离还是逃回、大城市与小城镇孰优孰劣的争辩。这些也都在给暂时放下工作 durchdringen 于浓浓年味的人们，带去难以 ringen 的现实提示：我们与故乡到底是什么的关系？为什么在哪里生活，会成为永不停歇的争论话题？中国式迁徙，何时能够得以安宁？我们的故乡，何处可以安放？
故乡：故去的家乡
诗人于坚的一篇写于2011年的文章《朋友是最后的故乡》这个春节在微信朋友圈流传甚广，引起诸多人的共鸣。他在文中说到：故乡不再是我的在场，只是一种记忆，这种记忆最活跃的部分是朋友们保管着。记忆 aufwecken 的是存在感，是乡音、往事、人生的种种细节、个人史、经验。如今，只有在老朋友那里才可以复苏记忆。中国世界焕然一新，日益密集的摩天大楼、高速公路，令文章无言以对。但朋友是旧的，朋友无法被拆迁，许多老朋友，也还坚持着“抽象理想最高之境”， unvermeidlich 是，己所不欲强加于人的恶行时有发生；路遥知马力，日久见人心，朋友继续故乡遗风，“止于礼”“止于至善”，像刘关张那样肝胆相照，言行一致，说着母语，时刻准备为朋友 sich zu opfern。
事实上，于坚说出了一个很多人 halten 在中心迟迟没有去发掘的真相，其实人们与故乡之间千言万语的 Gefühle，本质上只是寄托在微弱的载体之上的。由此，也引起“亲人是唯一的故乡”等真实的 gezeigte Emotionen，道尽了故乡与内心中的真实联系。这也说明，在这个已经被现代化与城市化裹挟的时代进程里，人们与故乡之间的藕丝，其实已经越来越微弱了，亲友等线索，成为最后的游子与故乡的中介或 Medium。而如果这些中介或 Medium 一旦中断，那么这个故乡，或者就将成为已经故去的家乡了，被遗忘，被 weggewaschen。
这种真实的心理的挖掘，在社会研究中来说，可能意味着更多。已故著名社会学家费孝通先生在《乡土中国》中说，“乡土社会是安土重迁的，生于斯、长于斯、死于斯的社会。不但是人口流动很小，而且人们所取给资源的土地也很少变动。在这种不分秦汉，代代如是的环境里，个人不但可以信任自己的经验，而且同样可以信任若祖若父的经验。一个在乡土社会里种田的老农所遇着的只是四季的转换，而不是时代变更。一年一度，周而复始。前人所用来解决生活问题的方案，尽可 kopieren 来作自己生活的指南。”
但是到现在，这种安土重迁——乡土中国的一个表征，也彻底反转了，中国人口流动已经成为全世界最频繁、数量最多的国家。故乡，开始被时代冲刷地日益 verblassen，不再是神圣不可疏离的圣地，或者说，它只是成为了旅游式的胜地了。
在频繁的流动与迁徙中，费孝通所说的这一套乡土生活运作模式和逻辑被剧烈地颠覆了。而一旦这种乡土中国的表征在退化，“故乡”这个很大程度上寄托于乡土中国之上的文化产物，也将会随之凋零。乡土中国的背后，是一种传统式的追求安稳、可预见、最具安全感的生存需求，年复一年，好像时间在乡土中是停滞不前。很显然，在流动的现代社会中，这一切都是不复存在的，变化、fremd、不可预见才是最显著的特征，时间在人们匆匆的脚步中，急剧飞逝。
如今，乡土中国的载体，随着农村的凋敝，已经慢慢缩到小城镇中，流动中国的载体，毫无疑问，是在大城市。于是，在乡土中国与流动中国之间，人们也遭遇的选择困惑 Problem，到底是具有更多中国传统的乡土中国式生活好，还是现代化与城市化之后流动中国的那种生活方式好？成为了众多人的一个纠结。
小城镇与大城市
刚刚出街的《南方人物周刊》封面报道就是“逃回北上广”，它说：马年春节过后，网络上关于大城市与小城市的比较与激辩，异乎寻常地喧嚣起来。无论是逃离北上广，还是逃回北上广，大城市、小城市之间的比较与取舍，以及由此带来的人群往返的潮汐，凸显的是一代城市谋生者安全感的 Mangel，“无根”的困惑。
在两三年前，迫于房价 Erhöhung、交通拥堵、环境恶化等大城市的各种工作、生活压力之后，很多的年轻人主动或被动地选择“逃离北上广”，形成一股返乡潮，返回二三线的小城市（随着中国城镇化的推动，“小城市”其实严格上应该称之为小城镇更合适，后文都将使用小城镇）。但在这一两年后，这些“逃离北上广”的人，经历了家乡诸如工作机会少、收入水准低、观念不合拍、人情世故繁杂等挫折与不如意之后，却又有很多人选择了“逃回北上广”。身在故乡为异客，反倒觉得自己的原先逃离大城市苦虽然苦一些，但却更自由和有发展机会，心情不像在家乡小城镇那般压抑。于是，家乡成为了回不去地方。
有人总结说：大城市拼钱，小城市拼 Familie。大城市的“拼钱”、小城镇的“拼 Familie”，体现的是两种文化形态与社会属性，拼钱是商业与资本为指挥棒的现代社会属性，拼 Familie 是以血缘等依托的乡土属性。小地方的安逸，有着乡土中国的安稳作为支撑，半熟人社会，关系网密织，网罗生长其中的人，有安全感。大城市是生人社会，在流动中，其是压力无法规避的代价，有着自由、机会，却少有安全感，明显地感受到贫富差距与阶层分化在自身形成的刺激。
在小城镇，个人被限定在先赋角色中（指建立在血缘、遗传等先天的或生理的因素基础上的社会角色），大城市中，有更多的机会，实现自致角色（指主要通过个人的活动与努力而获得的社会角色）。这一点，也很接近19世纪英国法学家梅因在其名著《古代法》中所指出的“身分与契约”的一个差异，乡土中国社会与现代社会的区分，接近于“身分社会”与“契约社会”的区别，也反应了从自然经济到商品经济（市场经济）、从“人治”到“法治”的进程。
大城市的自由与机会，更多的是法治与商品经济带来的人的解放（当然，也有拼钱的人的压迫），而小城镇的拼 Familie，则是自然经济（乡土社会的重要特征之一）、人治（讲关系和依靠血缘来分配资源）所 binden。
很显然，小城镇是乡土中国向现代社会迈进的未完成式，属于半乡土半现代的一个奇怪社会景观。也就是说小城镇，其实是乡村的放大版，同时也是城市的缩小版，它浓缩了中国的传统与现代，成为观察中国现代化最好的样本。可以说，在小城镇，是一个“杂交中国”：既有这现代化之后的物质与硬件，却还有浓厚的乡土中国的“差序格局”、着重人情世故，让有着优越先赋资源（拼 Familie）的人，获得异常的滋润与安逸，既能通过关系占据好的工作计划，还能够以此获得大城市能够享受的生活质量，早早地过上了有车有房的中产生活，甚至成为了令人眼红的“土豪”。但对于没有这些资源的人来说，则是难以 finden 到立足之地的黑暗角落。
对于较长时间有在大城市生活过却毫无资源依靠的人来说，相较之下，拼钱或许还让人更够接受些，至少拼钱，也是能有一定的个人奋斗与公平竞争的可能，拼 Familie 这种寄生于先赋的资源则毫无公平可言。于是，大城市与小城镇的优劣，本质上还是乡土社会与现代社会生活方式的一种比对，以及人们在这两种社会中的能否生存下去的问题，大城市不宜居、不让居，小城镇不易居、不能居，那么大迁徙就只能成为中国永恒的主题。
“中国式”迁徙
其实，不管是大城市与小城镇，在他乡与故乡之间，中国之所以能够每年都要发生人类奇观的大迁徙，还是在于人们难以融入所在地。奋斗多年，依然是外地人的 Verlegenheit，才是每年不得来回迁徙的根源；而资源配置、地域（城乡）差异，才是即 lieben 故乡，却又只能出走维持生计、无法守护家乡的根源。个体的命运，在这种大时代的背景下，一次最鲜明直白的映照，每个人都在其中找出自己的辛酸苦辣，不管是感性与理性，都在这种沉重的现实中，不得不开始 ängstlich。
改革开放之前，以户籍为标志的严格的城乡二元机制，牢牢地锁定了整个乡土社会的流动性。改革开放后，城市居民脱离了单位的全方位管辖，农村居民也摆脱了公社的无理 binden，在户籍制造的城乡二元格局的 Spalt 之间，开启了一场前所未有的社会流动。特别是这个拥有8亿多农民的乡土中国，随着迁徙和流动的约束逐渐减少，大量农村人口进入城市后，经历了市民化过程，在身份上由纯粹和传统的农民，向具有了更多现代性的“农民工”或“新市民”转变。二代农民工很多人已经实现了个人的市民化，个体上已经与城市居民没有明显的区别了，真正地实现了社会学家孟德拉斯所言的“农民的终结”。
但他们落脚城市，却依然难以在落地生根在城市。“人, die umziehen 活、树, die umziehen 死”，然而以户籍制度为桎梏的中国式流动，往往成为一种令人 verlegen 的身份迷失，以迁徙的主体农村进城务工人员为例，从最初的“盲流”到“外来工”、“农民工”，在工不工、农不农之间，始终连最基本的身份融入都无法做到，犹如成为一片无根的浮 Entenflott，改革开放三十多年以来，我们已经亲身感受了社会流动带给社会的种种好处，但是具体在个体层面，这些流动的人员，却一直无法 ringen mit 身份的 Bindung，实现真正的自由迁徙，而且也限制着社会流动的最优化。
回顾中国人口流动的变迁，在人口流动的客观需和不愿彻底放开的共同作用下，各地均陆续出台了一些渐进的措施，设立 Schwellen，在学历上、个人技术能力上，实行了严格的规定，有条件地放开部分入户的可能性，以鼓励所谓合理的流动。但是多年下来，只有极少部分人享受到了这种政策，绝大部分人只有望洋兴叹的份，大量进入城市从事低端工种的人士，没有学历、没有所谓的技术，但对当地同样作出了贡献，却只能 lagern 在自由流动的边缘，难以扎根城市，特别是北上广，犹如 Hologramme。
机会与发展决定了人的流动，人口流动是社会发展的必然结果，有利于人才交流和劳动力资源配置和社会均衡发展。快速的经济发展必然产生大量的人口流动，美国、澳大利亚以及我国香港等地都是世界上人口流动量大，人员迁徙最频繁的国家和地区，同时也是经济高速发展之地。而再从社会学角度看，人口流动分为向上流动和向下流动，一个社会如果缺少这样可上可下的流动，变成 erstarrt 的社会结构，那么其危害性就是，轻微的冲击都随时可能导致这个社会结构崩盘。顺畅的人口流动能促进社会结构的不断地新陈代谢。
但中国目前这种迁徙，很多一部分是一种平行流动，人们在同一个社会阶层的领域里左右移动，或者说转移工作，职业等，保持社会阶层不变，无法完全从农民到市民的身份转变。因此，进入大城市的是拥有着自由了，但这种自由，却是个体身体上的自由，却没有权利上的自由。这也是造成中国每年大迁徙的根本原由，难以落地生根，才让中国在进入21世纪以后，不得不还保持着安土重迁的传统。
中国式大迁徙，只有身在其中的人才体会的各种辛酸苦辣。而现在的迁徙，还加入了环境等造成的新的问题，“环境难民”逃往小城镇和农村的城市人越来越多的，成为“环境移民”。在这种情况下，如何发展更多的现代社会属性的小城镇，不仅关系到人们的生活质量，更关系到中国未来的良性的发展。因为仅仅依靠北上广这些大城市，而没有遍地发展良好的小城镇，中国就没有未来，而且小城镇的发展，还是医治现在大城市所有 Krankheit 的不二之策。
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Great migration China-style: where is our hometown?
Southern Metropolitan Daily commentator: Zhang Tianpan
Each Chinese New Year (Spring Festival) is a collective pilgrimage home for Chinese intending on reuniting with their families. Though some of them must travel long distances and encounter all kinds of difficulties, their steps still irrepressibly take them home. This phenomenon is perhaps unique in the world. Chinese people’s dependence on their hometown is a marvel of Chinese culture that is hard to ignore. The most obvious sign of this is the innumerable quantity of poetry and literature that pertains to one’s hometown: “I look up and gaze at the moon, I look down and think of home”, “The closer to home the more timid I feel, not daring inquire about my family”, “The local accent hasn’t changed, but my hair is sparse and greying” etcetera. Thinking of home always comes with deep emotions, it’s nostalgia hitting one right between the eyes. In recent years, a more modern kind of nostalgia has emerged, along the lines of “everyone’s hometown is being overrun”.
During and after Spring Festival this year, a new wave of reflections and writings pertaining to the mixed emotions towards one’s hometown has risen again. At the same time, people faced disputes over the merits of big cities and small towns, no matter whether they were coming back from one or leaving for one. These situations also give those that have temporarily stopped work and are immersed in the New Year atmosphere a real prompt: What is the real connection between us and our hometown? Why is it that wherever you live, this becomes an unceasing topic of debate? When will Chinese style migration become stress-free? Where can we find our home?
Hometowns: Dead Homes
The poet Yujian in the unyielding 2011 article “Friends are the Final hometown”, which has been spread far and wide among circles of friends on Weixin, has resonated greatly with a lot of people this Spring Festival. In the article he says: My hometown no longer has my presence, it’s just a memory, the most active part of which is being taken care of by my friends. What my memory awakens is a feeling of presence, my native accent, past events, all kinds of details of my life, my personal history and experience. Nowadays, it’s only by having old friends that it’s possible to revive old memories. China has completely changed. Increasingly more skyscrapers and highways make this article unable to respond. However, old friends can’t be dispossessed. Many old friends still persist in “the highest place of abstract ideals”. What’s unavoidable is that when you have evil intent, it will make itself known: just as distance determines the stamina of a horse, so does time reveal a person’s true heart. Friends continue the legacy of one’s hometown by “following the etiquette” and “having a state of perfection”. Just like how Liu Guanzhang shows total devotion, practise what you preach, speak your mother tongue, and be ready at any moment to sacrifice oneself for friends.
In fact, Yujian has spoken forth the truth that many people have inside of them but haven’t explored. Actually, the many things people say to express their feelings for their hometown is essentially a weak medium. This gives rise to the expressed emotions such as “one’s close relatives are the sole homeland”, as the only real connection between one’s hometown and one’s innermost being. This also explains, in the course of this era’s modernisation and urbanisation, the connection between people and their hometown is actually already becoming progressively weaker. Close family and friends are like the thread that joins, becoming the final link or medium between those living far from home and their hometown. If these links or mediums are broken off, then many hometowns will perhaps become dead hometowns, forgotten and washed away.
This kind of real introspection, looking at social studies, maybe signifies even more. The famous late sociologist Fei Xiaotong in “Native China” said, “people are deeply attached to their local society, in which they were born, raised, and will die. Not only is the population pretty much stationary, but also the land that provides natural resources hardly changes. In this kind of environment that is indistinguishable from the unchanging Qin Dynasty, not only can individuals trust in their own experience, they can also in the same way trust their ancestry. All that an old farmer in his local society has come across is the changing of the four seasons, rather than the change of an era. Everything moves in an annual cycle. Our forebears’ plan for resolving life’s problems, as far as was possible would be to take a leaf out of their own books.”
However, up until now, this deep attachment to one’s native land, representative of Native China, has been thoroughly turned upside-down. The frequency that China’s population moves from place to place and it’s volume now stands at the world’s highest. Native places have started to be eroded away by the era, fading more day by day. They are no longer the holy lands that cannot become estranged. Rather, they have just become touristy scenic spots.
From the aspects of the frequency of population movement and migration, the model and logic of life in one’s hometown that Fei Xiaotong talks about have been severely undermined. In addition, as soon as this kind of symbol of Native China starts to degenerate, one’s “hometown”, this high level product of culture that entrusts the care of Native China, will accordingly wither. Behind the scenes of Native China, there is a kind of a demand for a traditional existence that pursues stability, predictability and safety.Year after year, it seems that in people’s hometowns, time is at a standstill. It’s very clear that in modern society where people move from place to place, everything has a temporary existence, changes, and is strange. It’s impossible to say what the most outstanding characteristic is. In the frantic pace of modern society, time is fleeting.
Nowadays, Native China’s medium, with the impoverishment of rural areas, has slowly retreated to small towns. However, the medium for mobile China is, without a doubt, consigned to big cities. Consequently, people are faced with a bewildering choice between Native China and mobile China. Is it better to have more a more traditional, Native China style of life, or is it better to have the modernised and urbanised lifestyle of mobile China? This causes many people to feel at a loss.
Small Towns and Big Cities
In the most recent issue of “Southerner’s Weekly”, the cover story is “Fleeing Back to Big Cities”. It says: After this year’s Spring Festival, the comparison and heated debate between big cities and small towns on the internet is uncharacteristically lively. No matter whether returning to or parting from big cities, the comparisons and decisions between big and small cities, as well as the resulting tides of people going back and forth, highlight the lack of security in the generation of those who make a living in the cities and the bewilderment of “having no roots”.
Two or three years ago, restricted to high housing costs, traffic congestion, environmental degradation etcetera, after enduring every kind of stress in both work and life in big cities, many young people either actively or passively chose to “flee the big cities”, forming a tide of people returning to their hometowns of second and third-tier small cities. (With China’s push for urbanisation, actually “small cities” more suitably should be called small towns, so the remainder of this article will use this term.) However, one or two years later, these people that “fled the big cities”, found that there were few work opportunities in their hometowns, income levels were low, people’s views were not in step with their own, they didn’t know how to get on etcetera. After feelings of disappointment and things not being in line with their own wishes, many people in fact chose to “flee back to the big cities”. As a stranger in one’s hometown, one unexpectedly feels that the big city that one fled, although a little trying, in fact has more freedom and opportunities, and one’s mood doesn’t feel suppressed like it is in one’s home in a small town. As a result, hometowns have become places that can’t be returned to.
Some people conclude: in big cities people strive for money, in small cities people strive for a good family. The “strife for money” in big cities and the “strife for a good family” of small cities embody two kinds of cultural forms and social properties. Striving for money is a property of modern society that has business and economics as its baton. Striving for a good family is a property of one’s native land that relies on one’s bloodlines. Cosy little places have the stability of Native China as their support. People in these societies are pretty familiar with each other and relationship networks are close-knit, with people who have grown up in them having a sense of security. Big cities are societies of strangers in which the price of having unavoidable stress when moving from place to place brings freedom and opportunity, but not a sense of security. One can clearly sense the disparity between rich and poor and the difference in hierarchy provoking oneself.
In small towns, people are limited to their original role, (social characters that have foundations established in the bloodline, heredity and other innate or physiological elements), whereas in big cities there are more opportunities to create one’s own (social characters that are obtained by one’s activity and hard work). This is also very close to the discrepancy “from status to contract” pointed out by 19th century British jurist Sir Henry James Sumner Maine in his masterpiece “Ancient Law”. The distinction between society in Native China and modern society is close to the difference between a “status society” and a “contract society”. It also reflects the process of the change from a natural economy (with a bartering system) to a commodity economy (market economy), and from the “rule of man” to a “rule of law”.
Most of the freedom and opportunity in big cities is a result of the liberalisation of people through the rule of law and a commodity economy (of course, there is also the oppression of those who strive for money). However, striving for a good family in small towns is bound by a natural economy (the main trait of local societies) and the rule of man (in which social relationships and bloodlines are relied on to distribute resources).
It’s very clear that small towns lie in the halfway ground between Local China and modern society, belonging to a strange society that is half local and half modern. In other words, small towns are actually at the same time enlarged versions of villages and shrunken versions of cities, concentrating both the traditions and modern era of China, resulting in the finest specimens in which to observe the modernisation of China. We can say that in small towns there is a “hybrid China”: having the material and hardware from modernisation, but also having the “disorderly structure” of a strong Local China that has the emphasis on knowing how to get on in the world. This allows those with superiority and resources (who have strived for a good family) to be exceptionally well off and comfortable. By means of their relationships they are able to maintain a good work plan, and also because of this they can enjoy the quality of life that is possible in big cities. Very quickly they surpass the middle class that have their own cars and homes, so much so that they become the “nouveau riche”, provoking jealously in others. However, for people who do no have these resources, it is difficult to find a foothold in the dark corners.
For people who are in big cities for longer lengths of time but completely lack resources to rely on, in comparison striving for money perhaps can be more readily accepted. At least with striving for money it’s still certainly possible to have a personal struggle within a fair competition. With the strife for a good family, which involves the coveting of already bestowed resources, is not in the least bit fair, it could be said. So, the pros and cons of big cities and small towns are essentially a comparison of the lifestyles of local society and modern society, as well as whether people can continue to exist within these two different kinds of societies. Big cities are not suitable for living in, small towns can be impossible to live in, and so mass migration inevitably becomes an everlasting problem in China.
“Chinese Style” Migration
Actually, no matter whether it’s a big city or a small town, each year the human spectacle of mass migration between a foreign town and a hometown occurs in China, and still it’s difficult amongst people to become integrated in a place. After struggling for many years, it’s still the embarrassment of people away from home that is the root cause of why they can’t migrate back and forth. Due to resource allocation and differences between the areas (city and countryside), even if one loves their hometown, one has no choice but to leave it to maintain one’s livelihood, and so one is unable to protect the origin of one’s hometown. In this era, the most clear and distinct reflection of individual destiny is that everyone must find their own unique style, no matter whether it’s emotional or logical. In this kind of heavy reality, one cannot but start to get anxious.
Before the reform was opened up to the outside world, taking the census register as the mark of a strict urban and rural binary mechanism, entire local societies were firmly isolated. After the reform was opened up to the outside world, city residents broke away from all jurisdiction of one’s workplace. Village residents also broke free of the irrational restriction of communes. From the crack in the urban and rural binary structure which was created by the census register, an unprecedented level of migration occurred in society. What’s special about Native China, which has more than 800 million farmers, is that along with the gradual reduction in restrictions on migration, after a large portion of the farming population entered the cities causing a transformation in city residents, their status transformed from purely traditional farmers to more modern “migrant workers” or “new city residents”. After the transformation in city residents caused by many second generation migrant workers, there was no longer a clear distinction between them and the original city residents, thus genuinely bringing about what Henri Mendras spoke of as the “the end of farmers”.
Although they settled in the cities, it was still difficult for them to put down roots there. “Moved plants die, but people who move survive”, however, Chinese style migration that had the household census system as it’s shackles frequently causes a kind of identity loss amongst it’s people. Taking the bulk of people who migrated from the villages to the cities and became workers as an example, from the first “blind influx” to “employed outsiders” or “migrant workers”, lying somewhere in between workers and farmers, from start to finish even the most basic blend of identity was impossible to assimilate, with them being akin to floating, rootless duckweed. In the 30 plus years since the opening up of the reform, we have already personally felt every kind of benefit that a mobile society has brought to society, but when specifically talking about individuals, these people that move from place to place never have any way of confirming their own status, thus bringing about an actual migration of liberty and a restriction to the optimisation of movement within society.
Looking back at how the movement of China’s population has changed, when combining effects of the objective needs of and the unwillingness to completely unleash a mobile population, step by step measures have successively appeared everywhere thus establishing certain thresholds. Strict rules have been set up regarding qualifications and individual skills and capabilities. There is also the possibility of land being released for new housing, in order to encourage a so-called reasonable movement. However, over a number of years, there have only been a very small section of people who have enjoyed this kind of policy. The vast majority of people have inadequate credentials, having no qualifications and no so-called skills, and so undertake lower-end jobs upon entering the cities. Although they devote themselves to the area in the same way as before, they can only linger at the edge of freely moving crowds. It’s difficult for them to take root in the cities, especially in the largest ones, as if they were just illusions.
Opportunity and development decide how people move. A moving population is the inevitable consequence of a developing society, being beneficial to the interaction of professionals and the allocation of the labour force as well as the balanced development of society. Rapid economic development inevitably produces a large population movement. America, Australia, as well as my native Hong Kong etcetera are all parts of the world in which there are large moving populations. Countries and regions which have the greatest frequencies of migrations of workers at the same time are places in which there is rapid economic development. Looking again from a sociological perspective, if a society lacks a population that is mobile on all skill levels then its composition will become rigid, the danger is that even a small disruption could at any time result in a collapse of its structure. Unimpeded population movements can promote the constant metabolism of a society’s structure.
However, regarding this kind of migration in China today, many parts have population movements only on certain skill levels, with people roughly on the same social stratum migrating, or perhaps changing jobs or professions. This maintains the current social structure, making it impossible to completely change one’s identity from a farmer to a city resident. Therefore, although those that enter the cities have freedom, it is only the freedom of one’s body, not the freedom of one’s rights. This is also the cause of the fundamental reason for China’s annual mass migration; the fact that it’s difficult to take root. After entering the 21st century, this has given China no choice but to maintain the tradition of begrudging leaving place where one has lived for a long time.
Within Chinese style mass migration, only those who are skilled can have a diverse experience. Also migration nowadays has a new problem created by the environment; “environment refugees”. City people fleeing towards small towns and villages are increasing, becoming “environmental migrants”. In this kind of situation, it’s not certain how to develop more small cities with the attributes of modern society, not just pertaining to people’s quality of life, but more to China’s future healthy development. Since China only depends on the cities of Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, and also since there aren’t well-developed small towns everywhere, it simply has no future. In addition, it’s still best to go to big cities when seeking treatment for illnesses.
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Texte Bearbeiten
the marco polo project: 有神论还是无神论 – Religion or atheism (Auszug) Bearbeiten
人们在反复论说所谓神就是每一个人，每一个事物，只要注视自我，就能从中看到神；人人都可以成佛；参透之人就到达了神的境界等等。其实说来说去，还是无法划清神与非神的界限，还是无法说清究竟有神还是无神。
对于有神无神的纠结，来源于人对未知事物的恐惧，对于存在意义的焦虑，对于死亡的焦虑。
人确实对绝大多数的事物无法解释，科学能够解读的也许只占所有事物的5%，越是原初的人类越是如此，因此越是相信五花八门的神，相信占卜，相信冥冥中无法解释的规律或者纯粹的概率事件。为什么在现代科学兴起之后，世界就进入了一个世俗化过程，为什么宗教式微？就是因为人对一些事物可以做出解释了，对找到尚未有合理解释的事物的前景也有了预期，有了信心。
People continuously dwell on the existence of a supreme deity, but in fact the truth is laid out in such clarity that no further explanation is required. We can call all things that exist and the laws that govern them “god”, and we can address them by their own names.
People repeatedly assert the so-called god is actually each and every person and matter or thing; one only needs to look at oneself to see the god from within, supported by notions such as anyone can become the Buddha, or those who are enlightened ascends to god’s realm. The notions, however presented or even transformed, cannot draw the clear line between “dod” and “no-god”, and cannot define whether god exists.
The dilemma on god’s existence originates from humankind’s fear of the unknown; the concern for the purpose of their own existence, and their anxiety of death.
Humans actually don’t have a plausible explanation for the majority of matters and events, science can only explain at most 5% of everything there is, the less developed the civilisation, the more is left unexplainable, therefore people place their beliefs in multifarious gods; believing in fortune-telling; believing in unexplainable laws of nature or purely random events. Why is the world being secularised while religious faith is on decline at the rise of modern science? The answer is that people have explanations for some events, and is hopeful that solutions can be found for current unsolved problems.
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the marco polo project: 做一个没有职业艺术家的白日梦 – The daydream of a non-professional artist (Auszug) Bearbeiten
缘由是来自我两个MFA快毕业的艺术家室友，她们需要时间和空间去创作，所以她们不会接受一份全职工作，哪怕是与艺术相关。但她们自身当然没有资金来支持这些创作，所以她们在做的事，对毕业的打算，就是申请各种给钱的驻地项目，或者，引用一个室友的话，就是“我只想有人给我一个工作室，一个月1000美金，就那么简单。”
有时我真不懂艺术界的运作原理。如果你无法确保给予，凭什么索取呢？为什么说他们无法确保给予，因为哪怕其他所有行业都可对世界做出些许“贡献”，艺术创作本身的性质就不是参与世界基本运行，没有艺术世界的齿轮不会停。如果我说我觉得艺术应该是纯粹自发的，是不是老掉牙了？但至少艺术中不应带有强烈的目的性这一点还是在被赞同的。不是悖论么？
If we reject the idea that there is such a thing as a “professional artists”, can’t we start solving many questions? The commercialisation of art, the institutionalisation of art, the survival of artists, the closure of the art world around its own ideology, etc etc.
This reasoning comes from two of my room-mates at MFA, when they were about to complete their studies in fine arts: they need time and space to create, and therefore wouldn’t accept a full-time job, even if it was associated with the arts. But they obviously didn’t have the capital to support that creative work, so what they were doing as post-graduation plans was to apply for all sorts of funded residency programs, or, to quote one of these roommates: ‘all I want is for someone to give me work space and 1000 dollars a month, it’s as simple as that.’
Sometimes, I really don’t understand the operating principles of the art world. If there’s no way to ensure that there’ll be something, why seek? And why say that there’s no way to ensure there’ll be something, since event if all other sectors can make a little ‘contribution’ to the world, art itself, by nature, does not take part in the basic operations of the world, and the cogs of the world won’t stop turning if there’s no more art. If I say that I believe art should be purely spontaneous, is this not old-fashioned? But in the art world, this point is still being upheld. Isn’t that a paradox?
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Wikinews 中国2010年热钱流入激增 Bearbeiten
【2011年2月18日讯】
中国国家外汇管理局公布说，2010年，短期资本入境额度大幅窜升。专家指出，和中国庞大的经济总量相比，目前的热钱流入规模仍然有限。中国较高的通胀率主要是国内信贷增加的结果。
中国国家外汇管理局2月17日公布说，2010年，中国热钱流入净额为755亿美元，比2009年的291亿美元增长了一倍多。
热钱在理论上一般定义为国际短期投机套利基金，但实践中很难用严格的标准测量。中国国家外管局的计算方法是将外贸顺差、直接投资净流入、境外投资受益以及境外上市融资四个项目加在一起，再用当年外汇储备增量减去其相加之和。
外管局在最新发布的2010年中国跨境资金流动监测报告指出，近年来，由于中国经济维持了告诉增长，人民币单边升值预期的增强，热钱总体呈现小幅净流入态势。
从变化幅度来看，2010年热钱流入激增是2007年以来波动幅度最大的一年。华府智库传统基金会亚洲贸易政策高级研究员史剑道(Derek Scissors)这样解释其中的原因：“中国热钱入境在2010年比2009年翻了一倍多。我不感到奇怪。2009年中国经济比现在要弱得多，尽管GDP数字可能没有完全反映出这一点。短期资本随着经济强弱周期大幅度波动是完全正常的。”
中国国家外管局在报告中指出，从1994年到2010年的较长时段来观察，1994年到2002年期间中国热钱基本呈现净流出状态，而其后则呈现净流入。16年间总体净流出一千亿美元。
中国经济问题专家史剑道指出，仅从最近两年的增幅来看中国热钱并不全面。他认为，鉴于中国经济总量增长迅速，热钱对中国外汇储备和经济的影响其实有限。他说，“中国经济规模现在达到了6万亿美元。新增的300多亿美元热钱流入不是很大的数目，至少和中国国内的信贷扩张比起来不算什么。”
外管局在最新公布的报告中说，现行统计数字并不能准确地反映出热钱规模。因为在外汇储备增量中扣除贸易盈余、FDI、以及境外投资受益和上市筹资后的差额并非都是纯粹套利、违法违规或者不可解释的跨境资金流动。
华尔街日报报导说，近期热钱流入的激增将削弱中国政府控制通胀的努力。
2月15日，中国国家统计局公布了经过权重调整后的最新通胀数字。2011年1月，中国居民消费价格总水平同比上涨4.9%。其中，食品价格涨幅最为抢眼，超过10%。
不过，中国经济问题专家史剑道认为，尽管热钱可能在一定程度上推高了中国境内的资产价格，尤其是房价，但热钱对CPI的推动作用其实有限。他说，“中国自己的货币政策驱动了目前的通胀。现在的通胀是2009年信贷发放的效果的自然显现。中国开始试图控制信贷增量，但这需要一段滞后期。”
中国人民银行近日宣布对信贷计算方法作出重大调整，用“社会融资总量”取代“广义货币供应量”，以此更为全面地反映实体经济融资情况。
Noch keine Übersetzung
Das Buch der Riten: Qu Li (Teil 2): Bearbeiten
祭王父曰皇祖考，王母曰皇祖妣。父曰皇考，母曰皇妣。夫曰皇辟。生曰父、曰母、曰妻，死曰考、曰妣、曰嫔。寿考曰卒，短折曰不禄。
Übersetzung James Legge
In sacrificing to them, a grandfather is called 'the sovereign grandfather;' a grandmother,' the sovereign grandmother;' a father, 'the sovereign father;' a mother, 'the sovereign mother; a husband, 'the sovereign pattern.' While (they are) alive, the names of father, mother, and wifeare used; when they are dead, those of 'the completed one,' 'the corresponding one,' and 'the honoured one.' Death in old age is called 'a finished course;' an early death, 'being unsalaried.'
Yangzi Fayan -> Asking About Shen Bearbeiten
天神天明，照知四方。天精天粹，万物作类。
Englische Übersetzung siehe ctext.org
Yi Jing 易經 同人 Tong Ren Gemeinschaft mit Menschen
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Richard Wilhelm Bearbeiten
Anfangs eine Neun bedeutet: Gemeinschaft mit Menschen im Tore. Kein Makel.
Sechs auf zweitem Platz bedeutet: Gemeinschaft mit Menschen im Klan: Beschämung.
Neun auf drittem Platz bedeutet: Versteckt Waffen im Dickicht, steigt auf den hohen Hügel davor. Drei Jahre lang erhebt er sich nicht.
Neun auf viertem Platz bedeutet: Er steigt auf seine Mauer, er kann nicht angreifen. Heil!
Neun auf fünftem Platz bedeutet: Die gemeinsamen Menschen weinen erst und klagen, aber nachher lachen sie. Nach großen Kämpfen gelingt es ihnen, sich zu treffen.
Oben eine Neun bedeutet: Gemeinschaft mit Menschen auf dem Anger: keine Reue.
James Legge Bearbeiten
The first NINE, undivided, (shows the representative of) the union of men just issuing from his gate. There will be no error.
The second SIX, divided, (shows the representative of) the union of men in relation with his kindred. There will be occasion for regret.
The third NINE, undivided, (shows its subject) with his arms hidden in the thick grass, and at the top of a high mound.for three years he makes no demonstration.
The fourth NINE, undivided, (shows its subject) mounted on the city wall; but he does not proceed to make the attack (he contemplates). There will be good fortune.
In the fifth NINE, undivided, (the representative of) the union of men first wails and cries out, and then laughs. His great host conquers, and he (and the subject of the second line) meet together.
The topmost NINE, undivided, (shows the representative of) the union of men in the suburbs. There will be no occasion for repentance.
商朝
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